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Implied Private Remedies Under
Federal Statutes: Neither a Death

Knell Nor a Moratorium-Civil
Rights, Securities Regulation, and
Beyond
Thomas L. Hazen*
I.

INTRODUCTION

More than seventy years ago, Roscoe Pound pointed to the antagonistic relationship between judge-made common law and acts
of the legislature: "Not the least notable characteristics of American law today are the excessive output of legislation in all our jurisdictions and the indifference, if not contempt, with which that
output is regarded by courts and lawyers."' Ironically, there may
be even more truth to this sentiment today than in Dean Pound's
time. Although the interrelation between legislation and the common law has long concerned legal scholars,2 neither scholarly output nor the passage of time has eliminated the tension between our
two modes of lawmaking. While on the one hand this conflict can
be identified as a necessary part of our system of checks and balances, when taken to its extreme, it can thwart the symbiotic relationship between courts and legislatures.
Perhaps the most significant area of concern today arises as
courts consider whether to imply a private civil remedy based on
legislative fiat. Particularly within the realm of federal regulation,
some courts have recently tended to disregard the force of legislation by unduly denying private remedies that would serve to redress federal wrongs. Indeed, in light of five recent Supreme Court
*

Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. B.A., 1969, J.D., 1972,

Columbia University.
1.

Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARv. L. REV. 383 (1908).

2. See, e.g., Horack, The Common Law of Legislation, 23 IOWA L. REV. 41 (1937);
Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, in HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS (1934); Pound, supra
note 1; Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1936).
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decisions, 3 a critical reexamination of the federal judiciary's interpretation of the implied rights doctrine is justified. As will be
demonstrated below, however, although recent cases bring to the
implication problem a much needed framework for analysis, they
should not be taken to signal either a death knell or a moratorium
on federally implied rights of action.
A second age-old basis of tension that runs through the implication issue results from the courts' desire to further the interests
of federalism while at the same time avoiding undue infringement
upon the province of the states' judicial and legislative bodies.'
This tension has been continually recognized as a significant factor
in the determination of whether to imply a federal private right of
action.5 Judicial cognizance of the possible overreach of federalism
is not of recent vintage. In fact, the incursion of federalism was
first held to have reached unconstitutional dimensions in Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,6 which outlawed federal common law in
cases determined under federal diversity jurisdiction. A large body
of federal common law continues with regard to federal question
jurisdiction,7 however, and the current trend in the federal implication cases can be more readily placed in perspective when viewed
in conjunction with this expansive development of federal common
law. Unfortunately, both the courts and commentators have failed
to consider adequately the interrelation between these two lines of
federal cases. Accordingly, after analyzing the current status of the
implication rationale, this Article will examine the relevance of the
3. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979); Touche Ross &
Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979); Cannon v.
University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979); Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979).
4. There has been extensive debate concerning the impact of federalism on the Ameri-

can judicial and political systems. The surrounding issues have been elegantly drawn since
this country's inception, and it is therefore unnecessary to retread the path except insofar as
the debate relates directly to the subject matter of this article. On the general issue of federalism, see CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION (1958); ELLIOT'S DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (2d ed. 1836); THE FEDERALIST PAPERS. For a complete survey of the
problems of federalism as they relate to the judicial system, see P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D.
SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (2d ed. 1973). See also D. CURRE, FEDERAL COURTS, CASES AND MATERIALS (2d ed.
1975); C. McCORMICK, J. CHADBOURN & C. WRIGHT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL
COURTS (6th ed. 1976); Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L.
REV. 489 (1954).

5. See Part VI infra.
6. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See generally Friendly, In Praiseof Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 383 (1964); Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution (pts. 1-2), 53 Nw. U.L. Rav. 427, 541 (1958).

7. See Part VI infra.
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continually developing federal common law.
The section that follows briefly examines the theoretical bases
for and early jurisprudence of the implied rights doctrine. That examination is followed by a discussion of the developing criteria utilized by the Supreme Court. Then the Article focuses upon the recent implication cases to illustrate the current judicial elucidation

of prior amorphous standards. Finally, as noted above, the Article
looks to the federal common law and its relationship to the implication process.
II.

REFLECTIONS ON THE RELATIVE ROLES OF STATUTES AND THE
COURTS

Before embarking upon an analysis of the current federal jurisprudence, it is most helpful to be reminded of the proper respective roles of the courts and legislatures as they combine to formulate a unitary system of private law.8 Dean Pound9 was not the
only observer to point to what has been described as the "instinctive antagonism toward legislation." 10 This antagonism not only affects the manner in which courts approach statutory interpretation
in general, but also appears within the context of the implication
process itself.
Implication of a private remedy based upon penal legislation is
an off-shoot of the doctrine of negligence per se. Both commentators1 1 and courts12 have long debated the proper balance between
8. On both general and more specific levels of analysis, the tension between courts and
legislatures and the process of judicial statutory construction has long been a topic of scholarly analysis. The discussion contained in this section is not an attempt to review this vast
field of knowledge, but rather to point to the primary competing theories and considerations. For more detailed treatments of the issues surrounding statutory interpretation, see J.
COHEN, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS ON LEGISLATION (2d ed. 1967); H. REED, J. MACDONALD, J.
FORDHAM & W. PIERCE, MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION (3d ed. 1973); J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES
AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (3d ed. 1943); de Sloovere, Steps in the Process of Interpreting Statutes, 10 N.Y.U. L.Q. Rav. 1 (1932); Frank, Words and Music: Some Remarks on
Statutory Interpretation,47 COLUM. L. REv. 1259 (1947); Freund, Interpretationof Statutes, 65 U. PA. L. REv. 207 (1917); Friedmann, Statute Law and Its Interpretationin the
Modern State, 26 CAN. BAR Rzv. 1277 (1948); Radin, Early Statutory Interpretation in
England, 38 ILL. L. REv. 16 (1943); A Symposium on Statutory Construction, 3 VAND. L.
REv. 365 (1950).
9. See text accompanying note 1 supra.
10. Lowndes, Civil Liability Created by Criminal Legislation, 16 MINN. L. REv. 361
(1932).
11. See generally id.; Morris, The Relation of CriminalStatutes to Tort Liability, 46
HARv. L. REv. 453 (1933); Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action, 27 HARv. L. REV. 317
(1914).
12. See E. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 17.6 (1956); W. PROSSER, THE
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legislatively mandated standards of conduct and those established
by common-law torts. Traditionally, the negligence per se debate
has revolved around the amount of weight, if any, to be given to
the statutorily defined standard of conduct.13 Since the abolition of
a federal common law in diversity cases,14 the negligence per se
approach appears to be of much less value, for the only alternative
for federal courts under such an analysis would be to look to the
legislation as impliedly creating its own statutory tort. One might
argue, however, that negligence per se principles should nonetheless be applied to federal statutes whose enactment predates the
Erie decision. The rationale would be that Congress, aware of negligence per se principles, knew that its criminal legislation would
necessarily have an effect upon the most analogous federal common-law remedy. This position may be stronger in the case of a
statute that contains an express grant of federal jurisdiction. In
fact, in some instances post-Erie decisions have gone so far as to
imply a remedy based upon such a jurisdictional provision. 15 This
approach, however, has recently been discredited, at least within
the context of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.8
In his seminal work on tort liability based upon penal legislation, Dean Thayer argued that the implication issue was totally
separate from this negligence theory. In Thayer's opinion a criminal statute should never be used to create civil liability:
Proper regard for the legislature includes the duty both to give full effect to
its expressed purpose, and also to go no further. The legislature could, if it
chose, have provided in terms that any one injured by a breach of the statute
LAW OF TORTS § 36 (4th ed. 1971).
13. The current approach of the courts can be gleaned from § 286 of the RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF TORTS (1965):
§ 286. When Standard of Conduct Defined by Legislation or Regulation Will be
Adopted
The court may adopt as the standard of conduct of a reasonable man the requirements
of a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation whose purpose is found to be
exclusively or in part
(a) to protect a class of persons which includes the one whose interest is invaded,
and
(b) to protect the particular interest which is invaded, and
(c) to protect that interest against the kind of harm which has resulted, and
(d) to protect that interest against the particular hazard from which the harm
results.
14. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
15. E.g., J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
16. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979). See text accompanying notes 196-206 infra. As is pointed out in Part VI, infra, an analogue to the
negligence per se approach can and should coexist with the implication doctrines that are
currently in vogue.
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should have a remedy by civil action. Such a provision is familiar in criminal
statutes. Its omission in this instance must therefore be treated as the deliberate choice of the legislature, and the court has no right to disregard it. 17

While Thayer's strict constructionist approach has no doubt left
its imprint on the current jurisprudence, it has nevertheless been

repeatedly repudiated as a general proposition by the courts.""
Commentators, too, have sharply contested Thayer's rigid approach and have found fault with his basic premise. Essentially,
Thayer's argument fails to grasp the fact that the expressio unius

est exclusio alterius rationale, like any canon of statutory interpretation, has a correlative conflicting canon. 19 Consequently, while
Thayer's philosophy has been echoed by many eminent jurists,2 0 it
is now common for courts to seek out the legislative purpose of
statutes under judicial scrutiny. Moreover, although it has been
suggested that even this inquiry must be framed as narrowly as
possible, there can be no doubt that legislative purpose should and
does have a role to play in statutory interpretation and, hence, in
the implication process in particular.2 '
17. Thayer, supra note 11, at 320.
18. For a most striking example, see the Minnesota experience discussed in note 111
infra.
19. For a classic demonstration of this proposition, see the 26 correlative "thrusts"
and "parries" of the "diplomatic tongue" of statutory interpretation in Llewellyn, Remarks
on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes are to
be Construed,3 VAND.L. REV. 395, 401-06 (1950). See also Murphy, Old Maxims Never Die:
The "Plain-MeaningRule" and Statutory Interpretationin the "Modern" Federal Courts,
75 COLUM. L. REv. 1299 (1975).
20. E.g., Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REv.
527, 533 (1947): "no one will gainsay that the function in construing a statute is to ascertain
the meaning of words used by the legislature. To go beyond it is to usurp a power which our
democracy has lodged in its elected legislature."
21. Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation,12 HARv. L. REv. 417, 419 (1899):
"We do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only what the statute means."
As Breitel said, this is far from an easy task, but it is a necessary starting point:
The suggestion that legislative intent and purpose be followed provokes the plaint
that intent and purpose are frequently intent. This represents a failure to recognize
that there are levels of legislative intent and purpose, just as there are levels of generalization in the stating of propositions of law.
Of course, there is no legislative intention specifically with respect to every statute,
and every part of every statute. In the enactment of statutes there is delegation, too,
with respect to sponsorship and draftsmanship, just as there is delegation to the courts
to implement statutes. The legislature expects that statutes will be drafted by others,
not only by its arms, such as committees and commissions, but also by agencies and
individuals outside the legislature. In such situations the intent, purpose, and draftsmanship of others is adopted as its own by the legislature. On this theory there is no
statute without a legislative intent or purpose. It is a glib superficiality to suggest
otherwise.
C. BaIrrEL, THE COURTS AND LAW MAKING IN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS TODAY AND ToMoRRow 27
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In discussing the question of statutory interpretation, Jerome
Frank argued that courts should refrain from undue literalism
when confronted with a statute:
Centuries ago, Aristotle illuminatingly discussed the problems of statutory
interpretation. When judges today grumble that invariably their difficulty in
learning the meaning of statutes is the fault of the legislature, they should be
told to recall that long ago he wrote that on many subjects a wise legislature
will deliberately use vague and flexible standards. Most of the modern expositions of legislative construction are but restatements, with here and there a
bit of embroidery, of what Aristotle said. For instance, recent essays on
"gaps" in legislation, on "unprovided cases," and on the "equity" of a statute,
rely on sources which in turn are glosses on passages in the Stagarite's writings. That despite the centuries of discussion we still have no precise answers
to these and cognate problems stems from the fact that statutory interpretation is not a science but an art."

Frank believed that while in some instances "literal interpretation
of a [statute] is indubitably correct," often it "will yield a grotesque caricature of the legislature's purpose. '2' Learned Hand
agreed with this view and was critical of an overly inflexible judiciary: "[O]ne of the surest indexes of a mature and developed jurisprudence [is] not to make a fortress out of the dictionary; but to
remember that statutes always have some purpose or object to accomplish, whose sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the surest guide to their meaning. '2 4 Similarly, in searching for the appropriate scope of remedies for statutory violations, the courts have
properly rejected Thayer's suggested per se rule against implication of private causes of action.
This is not to say that the courts should be overly imaginative
in creating civil remedies. Perhaps, as recent cases indicate, 6 the
judiciary should take a conservative stance in this regard. A court
should examine the statutory regulation in question as a whole
before determining whether a remedy should be implied as necessary to effectuate the legislative purpose.2 6 As additional remedies
(Paulsen ed. 1959). See also de Sloovere, PreliminaryQuestions in Statutory Interpretation, 9 N.Y.U. L.Q. Rav. 407 (1932); Horack, In the Name of Legislative Intention, 38 W.
VA. L.Q. 119 (1932); Jones, Statutory Doubts and Legislative Intention, 40 COLUM. L. REV.
957 (1940); MacCallum, Legislative Intent, 75 YALE L.J. 754 (1966); Nutting, The Ambiguity of Unambiguous Statutes, 24 MINN. L. REv. 509 (1940); Tunks, Assigning Legislative
Meaning: A New Bottle, 37 IowA L. REv. 372 (1952); Willis, Statute Interpretation in a
Nutshell, 16 CAN. BAR REv. 1 (1938).

22.
23.
24.
25.

Frank, supra note 8,at 1259 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 1262.
Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1945).
See Parts IV & V infra.

26. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). In the words of Benjamin Cardozo:
"[T]he meaning of a statute is to be looked for, not in any single section, but in all the parts
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will, by their very nature, frequently further the legislative purpose, the key to the proper standard is the necessity-ratherthan
merely the desirability-of such a remedy. Similarly, the remedy
must effectuate rather than merely supplement or strengthen the
statutory purpose. If there is any one single element running
through the recent implication cases, it is the requirement of legislative intent to provide a private remedy. Accordingly, the task for
the courts is not an easy one. They must heed the express dictates
of the legislation and not lightly imply a private right of action in
the face of legislative silence.2 Nevertheless, in certain cases the
overall legislative history, purpose, and scope of the statutory
scheme may compel implication of a private cause of action even
though the statute itself is mute on this point.

III.

THE PROBLEM DEFINED: AN OVERVIEW OF IMPLICATION

UNDER THE SECURITIES ACTS AND THE PROTECTION OF CIVIL

RIGHTS

It has been nearly sixty-five years since the Supreme Court
first addressed the question of implying a private remedy from federal prohibitory legislation, 28 and in the years that have followed
that first decision, both the Court and the lower courts have been
increasingly active in the implication area.29 Most of the cases decided in the first fifty years of this period denied the availability of
implied private relief.30 The judicial attitude changed, however, in
1964, when in J.L Case Co. v. Borak"1 the Supreme Court adopted
an extremely expansive approach to the implication process. By
1975, the Court realized that it was time to find a replacement for
the ad hoc approach that typified post-Borak decisions; consequently, in the seminal case of Cort v.Ash32 it attempted to formulate general principles of implication. In the five years since Cort,
together and in their relation to the end in view." Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388,
439 (1934) (Cardozo, J., dissenting).
27. It has been suggested that legislative intent is not and should not be a necessary
part of the implication process: "[T]he process of implication ... is neither limited by affirmative legislative 'intention' nor is [it] necessarily a process of statutory construction."
Mowe, Federal Statutes and Implied Private Actions, 55 OR. L. REv. 3, 7 (1976). However,
not even the Borak Court has gone this far. As will be seen throughout this Article the
question of legislative purpose is most germane to implication.
28. Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916).
29. See authorities cited in notes 36-37 infra.
30. See text accompanying notes 101-15 infra.
31. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
32. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
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federal courts on all levels have sought to refine its approach. Most
of the activity has involved interpretation of federal securities laws
by lower federal courts, but an equally significant body of case law
has developed with respect to private remedies in the area of civil
rights as well. An understanding of the historic development of the
private rights doctrine, in both the securities and civil rights context, would then be helpful in comprehending the overall problem
that many courts now face.
A.

The Evolution of Private Remedies Under the Securities
Laws

In 1946 Judge Kirkpatrick, in Kardon v. National Gypsum
Co.,ss recognized an implied private right of action arising out of
SEC rule 10b-5."' This decision became the springboard for one of

the most significant judicial revolutions in history. Even beyond its
impact on the securities laws, Kardon has been described as the
"first major breakthrough" for implied rights since the seminal
Rigsby decision thirty years earlier.3 5 In addition to planting the
acorn for the oaken remedy under rule 10b-5,36 Kardon set the
stage for the recognition of several other implied rights of action
under the securities acts.3 For example, three years after Kardon,
another district court recognized a private remedy under the parallel antifraud provision contained in section 17(a) of the Securities
Act of 1933. 8 Similarly, despite several earlier lower court deci33. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
34. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980). Rule 10b-5 is the administrative embodiment of the
Securities and Exchange Act's general antifraud provision that outlines manipulative and
deceptive practices in connection with the purchase or sale of a security. See section 10b-5
of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976). See generally A. BROMBERG, SECURITIS
LAw: FRAUD, SEC RuLE 10b-5 (1977).
35. Gamin & Eisberg, The Implied Rights Doctrine, 41 U. Mo. K.C. L. REV. 292, 293
n.4 (1972). See Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916), discussed in the text
accompanying notes 94-96 infra.
36. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). See generally
A. BROMBERG, supra note 34; Joseph, Civil Liability Under Rule lOb-5-A Reply, 59 Nw.
U.L. REv. 171 (1964); Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule 10b-5: JudicialRevision of Legislative Intent?, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 627 (1963).
37. See 2, 5 L. Loss, SEcurrms REGULATION 932-56, 2879-925 (2d ed. 1961, 2d ed.
Supp. 1969). See also authorities cited in note 73 infra.
38. Osborne v. Mallory, 86 F. Supp. 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). See 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)
(1976). Although not yet formally recognized by the Supreme Court, most circuit and district courts that have faced the issue have acknowledged the section 17(a) remedy. See generally Hazen, A Look Beyond the Pruning of Rule 10b-5: Implied Remedies and Section
17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 64 VA. L. REv. 641 (1978).
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sions to the contrary,3 ' the Supreme Court followed the lead of
Judge Kirkpatrick in Kardon and in 1964 acknowledged an implied remedy under the proxy regulation provisions of section 14(a)
of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act.4 0 The Court also later gave its
express sanction to the 10b-5 action4 1 and over the years handed
down a series of opinions that collectively established a broad
range of expansive remedies.42
Following the liberal implication approach taken by the Supreme Court, the lower federal courts likewise began and have continued to recognize implied remedies under various sections of the
securities acts. For example, in addition to expanding the scope of

the antifraud remedies for purchases and sales of securities' and
for inaccuracies in proxy material disseminated to solicit shareholder votes,' 4 the courts recognized a remedy for investors who
were injured by misstatements made in the course of a corporate
takeover by way of a tender offer.45 The lower federal courts also
expanded their implication efforts into the areas of trust indentures, 46 the margin rules affecting securities purchased on credit,' 7
39. E.g., Dann v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 288 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1961).
40. J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976). See
generally 5 L. Loss, supra note 37, at 2880-83 (2d ed. Supp. 1969).
41. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
42. E.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972); Mills v. Electric
Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
43. Rule lOb-5 prohibits fraud and misstatements in connection with the purchase or
sale of a security. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980).
44. See authorities cited in note 40 supra.
45. E.g., Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 873 (1974). See Note, Chris-Craft: The Uncertain Evolution of Section 14(e), 76
COLUM. L. REv. 634 (1976). In 1968, the Williams Act Amendments to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 introduced various filing and disclosure requirements with regard to
tender offers for the shares of a publicly traded company. Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454
(1968) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1976). See generally E. ARANOW, H.
EINHORN & G. BERLsTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL
(1977); Bromberg, The Securities Law of Tender Offers, 15 N.Y.L.F. 462 (1969). More specifically, § 14(e) imposes broad antifraud proscriptions against all transactions in connection
with a tender offer. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976). Recently, the Supreme Court has cut back, if
not all together eliminated the § 14(e) remedy. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430
U.S. 1 (1977), discussed in the text accompanying notes 171-73 infra. See also Note, Private
Rights of Action for Damages under Section 13(d), 32 STAN. L. REv. 581 (1980).
46. E.g., Zeffiro v. First Pa. Banking & Trust Co., 623 F.2d 280 (3d Cir. 1980). See
generally Dropkin, Implied Civil Liability Under the Trust Indenture Act: Trends and
Prospects,52 TUL. L. Ray. 299 (1978).
47. See Marrero v. Banco di Roma (Chicago), [Current Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP.
(CCH) 1 97,584 (E.D. La. April 8, 1980); Martin v. Howard, Weil, Labouisse, Friedricks,
Inc., [Current Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 97,586 (E.D. La. March 26, 1980). See
generally Climan, Civil Liability Under the Credit-RegulationProvisions of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 206 (1978).
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and the regulation of investment advisers. 48 The courts have even

gone so far as to imply avenues for private relief under stock exchange and broker dealer self-governing rules. 49 Moreover, this activity has not been limited to the recognition of additional remedies; the courts have also been quite liberal in redefining the
parameters of previously created remedies.
While the lower federal courts have continued to expand remedies under the securities acts,50 the Supreme Court itself, however, has shifted direction. The result has been the development of
two distinct lines of federal jurisprudence-one at the Supreme
Court level, the other in the circuit and district courts.5 1 The Court

has not only cut back on the scope of existing implied remedies;52
it has also curtailed its recognition of additional implied avenues of
relief. 53 Most recently, in TransamericaMortgage Advisors, Inc. v.
Lewis,5 the Court curiously denied the existence of an implied private damage remedy while at the same time it recognized a right of
rescission. This narrowing trend seems generally consistent with
the Court's frequently stated concern over overcrowded federal
48. See generally Note, Private Cause of Action Under Section 206 of the Investment
Advisers Act, 74 MICH. L. REv. 308 (1975).
49. See generally Lashbrooke, Implying a Cause of Action for Damages: Rule Violations by Registered Exchanges and Associations, 48 U. CIN. L. REv. 949 (1980); Lowenfels,
Implied Liabilities Based Upon Stock Exchange Rules, 66 COLUm L. REv. 12 (1966); Comment, Private Actions Under the Suitability and Supervision Duties of Exchange and
Dealer Association Rules: The Fraud Requirement, 16 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 773 (1979). A
further possible area for implication is the recently adopted Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,
Pub. L. No. 95-213, tit. 1, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78ff
(Supp. I. 1977)). See generally Siegel, The Implication Doctrine and the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, 79 CoLuM. L. REv. 1085 (1979). For a discussion of implied remedies under
the Commodity Exchange Act, see text accompanying notes 238-81 infra.
50. E.g., Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. American Fidelity Life Ins. Co.,
606 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1979); Kidwell v. Meikle, 597 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1979); Goldberg v.
Meridor, 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978).
51. See Hazen, Corporate Mismanagement and the Federal Securities Acts' Antifraud Provisions:A FamiliarPath With Some New Detours, 20 B.C. L. Rev. 819 (1979).
52. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (deception or manipulation is
required in a 10b-5 action); TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976) (giving a
relatively narrow reading of the materiality requirement of § 14(a)); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (requiring scienter in 10b-5 actions); Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (the 10b-5 plaintiff must be either a purchaser or
seller of the securities in question). See generally Lowenfels, Recent Supreme Court Decisions Under the Federal Securities Laws: The Pendulum Swings, 65 GEo. L.J. 891 (1977).
53. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979) (denying a remedy under
section 17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430
U.S. 1 (1977) (denying a remedy in the hands of a competing tender offeror under section
14(e) of the Exchange Act).
54. 444 U.S. 11 (1979) (decided under section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act of
1940).
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dockets.
B. Implied Rights in the Civil Rights Context
Beyond the cases arising in the securities area, the other recent major exception to the no-implication trend has been found in
cases involving the protection of federal statutory 5 or constitutional" individual and civil rights. In the same year in which Kardon was decided, the Supreme Court in Bell v. Hood57 was asked
to recognize a private remedy on behalf of a plaintiff who asserted
a violation of his fourth and fifth amendment rights by federal officers. Although there is an express federal damage remedy for constitutional torts committed by state officials,58 the Court was confronted with complete congressional silence with regard to federal
officials. Although it did not reach the merits of the plaintiff's
claim, the Court recognized the implied remedy and indicated that
the crux of the issue was the invasion of a federally protected
right:
Where federally protected rights have been invaded, it has been the rule from
the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their remedies so as to grant
the necessary relief. And it is also well settled that where legal rights have
been invaded, and a federal statute provides for a general right to sue for
such invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy to make good the
wrong done."

While the Court's flexible "necessity" test in Bell was to reappear
later within the more general context of statutory implication, 0 it
was initially viewed as limited to constitutional considerations.
Fifteen years after Bell, in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,' the Court erased any
questions left unanswered by its prior ruling by permitting a private plaintiff to recover for a violation of his constitutional rights.
The special status given by the Court to claims of interference with
55. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
56. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
57. 327 U.S. 678 (1946).

58. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
59. 327 U.S. at 684 (footnotes omitted). See generally Katz, The Jurisprudence of
Remedies: ConstitutionalLegality and the Law of Torts in Bell v. Hood, 117 U. PA. L. REV.

1 (1968).
60. See Hewitt-Robins, Inc. v. Eastern Freight-Ways, Inc., 371 U.S. 84 (1962), discussed in the text accompanying notes 103-06 infra.
61. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). See generally Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1532 (1972); Lehmann, Bivens and its Progeny: The
Scope of a ConstitutionalCause of Action for Torts Committed by Government Officials, 4
HASTINGS CONST.

L.Q. 531 (1977).
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federally protected individual and civil rights was further highlighted by two recent decisions. In Davis v. Passman62 the Court
declared that the implication of remedies under the constitution is
not limited by the doctrines it has developed with regard to statutory implication. Additionally, in Cannon v. University of Chicago63 the Court recognized an implied remedy to protect a statutory grant of civil rights. As will be developed more fully below,"
Cannon, like Transamerica and the numerous cases interpreting
the securities acts, represents a significant departure from the restrictive approach previously taken by the Burger Court. It is too
early to know whether the areas of investor protection and civil
rights constitute a sui generis approach or, alternatively, if those
are simply recent examples of a more generalized emerging theory
of implication.
C. Recent Development of the Implication Doctrine
In addition to Transamerica and Cannon the Supreme Court
decided two other cases dealing with statutory implication in
1979.5 This bevy of activity makes the time right for an examina-

tion of the current methodology. The implication problem generally has sweeping ramifications for federal jurisprudence, as it encompasses a broad range of substantive areas subject to federal
legislation. For example, the Supreme Court has permitted private
litigants to vindicate their federal rights through implied remedies
for violation of labor relations legislation,"8 interference with federally guaranteed voting rights,67 denial of civil and constitutional
rights, 8 and discrimination. 9 The lower federal courts have been
active in an even broader range of substantive areas. T°
62. 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
63. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
64. 'See text accompanying notes 176-84 infra.
65. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979); Chrysler Corp. v. Brown,
441 U.S. 281 (1979).
66. E.g., Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Eng'rs, 323 U.S. 210
(1944).
67. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
68. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
69. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
70. See Mowe, supra note 27, at 9-10:
In the wake of landmark decisions in labor representation, communications interception and divulgence, racial discrimination in airline passenger service, and securities
law, federal courts in recent years have extended the doctrine [of implied remedies] to
civil rights in housing, labor-management relations, political contributions and expend-
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Commentators have, for the most part, examined the implication process solely within the confines of particular statutory provisions.7 1 While this type of ad hoc approach may be quite helpful,
it does not facilitiate an appreciation of a pervasive underlying
pattern that might predict the course of future implication cases.
Several observers have suggested that, as a general proposition, the
creation of implied causes of action in the federal courts has
slowed considerably, if not come to a halt.7 2 An examination of the
history of implication, 3 however, especially when read in light of
the most recent Supreme Court pronouncements, does not mandate this conclusion.
itures, welfare review, natural gas service, hospital facilities, admiralty, voting rights,
patent fraud, and non-racial discrimination in airline passenger service. There have
also been continuing developments in the original landmark areas.
(footnotes omitted).
71. E.g., Climan, supra note 47; Dropkin, supra note 46; Lashbrooke, supra note 49;
Lowenfels, supra note 49; Siegel, supra note 49; Note, Implied Civil Remedies for Consumers Under the Federal Trade Commission Act, 54 B.U. L. REV. 758 (1974); Note, Implying
a Civil Remedy from 15 U.S.C. § 1674(a), 54 Ne. L. REV. 744 (1975); Note, The Decline of
the Implied Private Cause of Action, Continued: The Third Circuit Construes the Federal
Aviation Act, 31 RuTGERS L. REV. 41 (1977); Note, supra note 45; Note, Implied Consumer
Remedy Under FTC Trade Regulation Rule-Coup de Grace Dealt Holder in Due Course?,
125 U. PA. L. REV. 876 (1977); Note, Private Rights of Action for HandicappedPersons
Under Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act, 13 VAL. U.L. REV. 453, 476-92 (1979); Comment, Private Remedies Under the Consumer Fraud Acts: The Judicial Approaches of
Statutory Interpretationand Implication, 67 Nw. U.L. REv. 413 (1972).
72. See McMahon & Rodos, JudicialImplication of Private Causes of Action: Reappraisal and Retrenchment, 80 DICK. L. REV. 167 (1976); Morrison, Rights Without Remedies: The Burger Court Takes the Federal Courts out of the Business of ProtectingFederal
Rights, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 841 (1977); Mowe, supra note 27; Pillai, Negative Implication:
The Demise of PrivateRights of Action in the Federal Courts, 47 U. CIN. L. REv. 1 (1978).
See also Goldstein, A Swann Song For Remedies: Equitable Relief in the Burger Court, 13
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1978). But see Steinberg, Implied Private Rights of Action
Under Federal Law, 55 NoTRE DAmE LAW. 33 (1979).
73. For earlier discussions that trace the development of the implication process in the
federal courts see Armstrong, Expressio Unius, Inclusio Alterius: The Fagot-Gomez Private
Remedy Doctrine, 5 GA. L. REV. 97 (1970); O'Neil, Public Regulation and Private Rights of
Action, 52 CALIF. L. REV. 231 (1964); Note, The Phenomenon of Implied Private Actions
Under Federal Statutes:JudicialInsight, Legislative Oversight or Legislation by the Judiciary?, 43 FORDHAm L. REV. 441 (1974); Note, Implying Civil Remedies from Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77 HARv. L. REV. 285 (1963); Note, Emerging Standards for Implied Actions Under Federal Statutes, 9 U. MICH. J.L. REP. 294 (1976); Note, Implied Actions
Under Federal Statutes-The Emergence of a Conservative Doctrine, 18 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 429 (1976); Comment, Implying Private Causes of Action from Federal Statutes: Amtrak and Cort Apply the Brakes, 17 B.C. INDus. & CoM. L. REv. 53 (1975); Comment, Private Rights from Federal Statutes: Toward a Rational Use of Borak, 63 Nw. U.L. Rev. 454
(1968); Comment, Private Rights and Federal Remedies: Herein of J.I. Case v. Borak, 12
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1150 (1965); Comment, PrivateRights of Action Under Amtrak and Ash:
Some Implicationsfor Implication, 123 U. PA. L. Rev. 1392 (1975). See also Note, Implied
Causes of Action in the State Courts, 30 STAN. L. REV. 1243 (1978).

1346

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:1333

As noted earlier, several recent cases have illustrated an increased divergence on the part of lower federal courts from the
conservative trend that has dominated the Supreme Court's implication holdings since Borak.7 ' There can be no doubt that many
federal courts are resisting the Court's recent rulings. Whether this
apparent split between the Court and the lower courts is desirable
necessarily depends upon proper identification of the current high
court position. The present dichotomy is, of course, anomalous to
the extent that the Supreme Court's opinions are read as placing a
moratorium upon implied remedies. This view, however, is an unduly rigid interpretation of the Court's current approach. While
there is no question that the Court is setting relatively narrow parameters for implied rights of action, it continues to acknowledge
that private remedies have a place in the enforcement scheme of
federal statutes.
The part of this Article that follows contains an examination
of the implication process as it has developed in the federal courts.
As will be seen, the Supreme Court has gone through a cyclical
pattern of expansion and contraction in implying remedies with respect to a wide range of substantive areas. Accordingly, it is not
possible to glean a single unified theory from the sixty-five years of
Supreme Court activity. There are, however, a number of recurring
themes, and it is possible to view all of the diverse approaches as
part of a loosely defined pattern that was formulated into a four
part test in Cort v. Ash. In turn, it was the Cort decision that set
the stage for the Court's further refinement of its approach to leg6
7

islative implication.
IV.

THE FEDERAL IMPLICATION CASES: THE DEVELOPMENT OF A

REFINED

METHOD OF ANALYSIS

The implication of private remedies from legislative prohibi-

tions has long been recognized both by courts77 and commenta74. See generally Climan, supra note 47; Dropkin, supra note 46; Hazen, supra note
38; Lashbrooke, supra note 49; Note, supra note 48; Comment, supra note 49. See also
Note, Emerging Standards for Implied Actions Under Federal Statutes, 9 U. MICH. J.L.
REF. 294 (1976).
75. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
76. See Part V infra.
77. E.g., Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916); Couch v. Steel, 3 E. & B. 402,
118 Eng. Rep. 1193 (Q.B. 1854). In addition to the federal cases discussed herein there is a
well-established body of state court decisions that recognize the implied remedies doctrine.
See, e.g., Montalvo v. Zamora, 7 Cal. App. 3d 69, 86 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1970); B.F. Farnell Co.
v. Monahan, 377 Mich. 552, 141 N.W.2d 58 (1966); Zerby v. Warren, 297 Minn. 134, 210
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tors 8 as a proper function for the courts. The relevant cases can be
divided into two distinct lines. First, there are those in which the
statutory standard is borrowed by the courts for use in traditional
common-law actions.79 The classic example is Justice Cardozo's
pronouncement that an unexcused failure to comply with safety
appliance legislation is not merely evidence of negligence but "negligence in itself."8 0 While this rationale was the basis of the early
federal implication cases in the securities area,8 1 it has now fallen
into disrepute.82
Since the abolition of a general federal common law in Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins," the federal courts have no independently existing causes of action in which to apply the statutory
standard of care.8 Although state courts may still be free to utilize
the federal statutory standard in a negligence suit, this, of course,
does not aid the private litigant in cases in which the federal
courts are granted exclusive subject matter jurisdiction.8 5 There is,
however, a substantial body of federal common law that survives
Erie." Even aside from a negligence per se approach, the Supreme
Court has on at least one occasion recognized a statutory grant of
exclusive jurisdiction as a possible basis for creating an implied
N.W.2d 58 (1973). For a discussion of the impact of the federal decisions upon state jurisprudence see Note, Implied Causes of Action in the State Courts, 30 STAN. L. REV. 1243
(1978).
78. E.g., Lowndes, Civil Liability Created by Criminal Legislation, 16 MINN. L. REv.
361 (1932). See Part II supra.
79. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 286, which is reproduced in note 13 supra.
80. Martin v. Herzog, 228 N.Y. 164, 168, 126 N.E. 814, 815 (1920). See generally W.
PROSSER, LAW OF ToRTs (4th ed. 1971); Morris, The Relation of Criminal Statutes to Tort
Liability, 46 HARv. L. REv. 453 (1933); Morris, The Role of CriminalStatutes in Negligence
Actions, 49 COLUM. L. REv. 21 (1949).

81. E.g., Dann v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 288 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1961); Osborne v.
Mallory, 86 F. Supp. 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512
(E.D. Pa. 1946).
82. E.g., Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979); Touche
Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979). See Part VI infra.
83. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
84. As Justice Douglas aptly observed: "[W]e are not in the free-wheeling days antedating Erie. . . ." Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963). The common law necessarily allows much greater flexibility in fashioning new rights and remedies. Cf. Note, supra
note 77, at 1252-53 (1978) ("unlike federal courts, state courts can amplify legislatve policy
without worrying whether the statute enunciating the policy authorizes the new cause of
action").
85. For example, the Securities Act of 1933 grants concurrent jurisdiction to the state
courts while the 1934 Exchange Act speaks in terms of federal exclusivity. Compare 15
U.S.C. § 77v (1976) with 15 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1976).
86. See Part VI infra.
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right of action in J.L Case Co. v. Borak.'7 While this aspect of the

Borak decision has been dismissed as merely an isolated pronouncement,88 its continued utility as an implication technique
should not be underestimated. 9
The second line of federal implication cases is clearly distinct
from the negligence per se approach and depends upon the identification of a legislative intent to create a private remedy. 0 Although this second approach to implication has at times led to the
creation of broader private remedies, on the whole this line of
cases has in fact been responsible for the current apparent constriction of implied remedies.
In 1854 Lord Campbell echoed the rule that when a violation
of a statute causes damage to a private party in excess of the general public wrong, a private remedy exists: "[I]n every case, where
a statute enacts, or prohibits a thing for the benefit of a person, he
shall have a remedy upon the same statute for the thing enacted
for his advantage, or for the recompense of a wrong done to him
contrary to the said law."91 The United States Supreme Court accepted this rationale in 1916 and has been grappling with the problem ever since. In Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Rigsby92 the Supreme Court expressly adopted Lord Campbell's analysis by
choosing to recognize an implied remedy for injuries resulting from
a violation of the Federal Safety Appliance Act.93 The Court reasoned that:
A disregard of the command of the statute is a wrongful act, and where it
results in damages to one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute
was enacted, the right to recover the damages from the party in default is
implied .... This is but an application of the
maxim, ubi jus ibi remedium
a remedy].94

[where there is a right, there is

As is always the case, one can point to a countervailing maxim, in
this instance expressio unius est exclusio alterius, which, not surprisingly, was relied upon heavily by the Court sixty years later as
the basis for denying the existence of an implied private remedy
87. 377 U.S. 426, 428 (1964).
88. See Comment, Implying Private Causes of Action From Federal Statutes: Amtrak
and Cort Apply the Brakes, 17 B.C. INDus. & COM. L. REv. 53 (1975).
89. See text accompanying notes 255-56, 272-73 infra.
90. See text accompanying notes 17-27 supra.
91. Couch v. Steel, 3 E. & B. 402, 411, 118 Eng. Rep. 1193, 1197, (Q.B. 1854). See also
Thayer, supra note 11.
92. 241 U.S. 33 (1916).
93. Ch. 196, 27 Stat. 531 (1893), as amended 45 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1976).
94. 241 U.S. at 39-40.
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under the Amtrak Act.9 5
While it has been asserted that the above two maxims may be
fashioned into a workable standard that would allow implied actions only when there are no express statutory remedies," the Supreme Court's recognition of implied remedies for both violations
of the securities laws97 and transgressions of individual civil
rights 8 belies such an approach. Evidence of the fact that the absence of express remedies equally is not in itself outcome determinative is found in the Court's refusal in T.I.M.E. Inc. v. United
States" to recognize an implied right of action under the Motor
Carrier Act. 10 0 In denying the existence of a private remedy, the
T.I.M.E. opinion significantly qualified the implication doctrine by
rigidly pointing to the absence of an express remedy as evidence of
congressional intent to protect the new trucking industry from the
impact of extra-agency relief. 0 1 The T.I.M.E. Court's reasoning,
when read in conjunction with Rigsby, demonstrates that presumptions of statutory interpretation, while facilitating argumentation
of the issues, fail to state a generally applicable test, thereby inviting judges to formulate decisions based upon an elusive, if not outrightly fictional, legislative intent. 02 The most elucidating example
95. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453,
458 (1974). See note 102 infra; Comment, supra note 88.
96. See text accompanying notes 90-95 supra.
97. E.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). But see Cannon v. University of
Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 736 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting): "Borak, rather than signaling the
start of a trend in this Court, constitutes a singular and, I believe, aberrant interpretation of
a federal regulatory statute."
98. E.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979). See 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1976).
99. 359 U.S. 464 (1959).
100. 49 U.S.C. §§ 301-327 (Supp. II 1978). There are express remedies, however, in
parallel federal regulations. See 359 U.S. at 470. See also text accompanying notes 183-84
infra.
101. 359 U.S. at 477-78 n.18. See Comment, Private Rights of Action Under Amtrak
and Ash: Some Implications for Implication, 123 U. PA. L. Rv.1392, 1426 (1975). See
generally O'Neil, Public Regulation and Private Rights of Action, 52 CALIF. L. Rav. 231
(1964). The T.I.M.E. decision also rested heavily on the Court's reluctance to interfere with
the primary jurisdiction of the ICC. 359 U.S. at 474. See Mowe, supra note 27, at 20; Pillai,
supra note 72, at 30-31; Comment, The Doctrine of PrimaryJurisdictionand the T.I.M.E.
Case, 27 U. Cm. L. Rzv. 536 (1960). The primary jurisdiction doctrine was to resurface as a
basis for denying the existence of a private remedy. See text accompanying notes 157-59
infra.
102. Even the Amtrak Court that relied upon the expressio unius maxim conceded
that it was only the first step in legislative interpretation:
A frequently stated principle of statutory construction is that when legislation expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, courts should not expand the coverage of the statute to subsume other remedies. "When a statute limits a thing to be
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is found in the fact that just three years after the T.I.M.E. decision, the Court in Hewitt-Robins, Inc. v. Eastern Freight-Ways,
Inc. 0 recognized an action under the same section of the Interstate Commerce Act.10 The T.LM.E. case involved a shipper's after-the-fact complaint against allegedly unreasonable rates,
whereas Hewitt-Robins dealt with a carrier's unlawful routing
practices that affected a plaintiff who presumably was within the
class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted. 105 The
Hewitt-Robins decision was heralded as a return to the liberal test
of damage to an intended beneficiary.10 The panoply of standards,
however, confused the implication process. Consequently, with the
more doctrinaire maxims of legislative interpretation proving to be
unhelpful, the Court continued to attempt to refine the Rigsby test
until its decision in Cort v. Ash.107 Cort established a four factor
test that has governed all subsequent cases. 108
The key to the Rigsby analysis lies not only in the Court's reliance on the ever elusive factor of legislative intent, but more specifically upon the question of whether the legislation was enacted
for the "especial benefit" of a particular class. 109 This principle is
reflected in the first prong of the Cort test 110 and has become a
firmly embedded tenet of statutory analysis.1

11

Unfortunately, the

done in a particular mode, it includes the negative of any other mode." Botany Mills v.
United States, 278 U.S. 282, 289 (1929). This principle of statutory construction reflects an ancient maxim-expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Since the Act creates a
public cause of action for the enforcement of its provisions and a private cause of action only under very limited circumstances, this maxim would clearly compel the conclusion that the remedies created in § 307(a) are the exclusive means to enforce the
duties and obligations imposed by the Act. But even the most basic general principles
of statutory construction must yield to clear contrary evidence of legislative intent.
Neuberger v. Commissioner,311 U.S. 83, 88 (1940). Accordingly, we turn to the legislative history of § 307(a).
National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458
(1974).
103. 371 U.S. 84 (1962).
104. 49 U.S.C. § 316 (1976).
105. 371 U.S. at 87. See O'Neil, supra note 101, at 239-44; Comment, supra note 101,
at 1428.
106. O'Neil, supra note 101, at 269-70.
107. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). See text accompanying notes 160-61 infra.
108. See notes 161-64 infra and accompanying text.
109. It has been suggested that this is an overly restrictive limitation: "It is not clear
that this insistence upon the ranking of legislative beneficiaries, with the resultant denial of
protected status to all but the top-ranking beneficiary, serves any useful purpose or is required by the common law precedent." Pillai, supra note 72, at 20.
110. See text accompanying note 163 infra.
111. A most striking example is Zerby v. Warren, 297 Minn. 134, 210 N.W.2d 58
(1973), in which the Minnesota Supreme Court recognized an implied remedy for violation
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most recent Supreme Court decisions jeopardize the proper function of this factor insofar as "the common law 'especial' beneficiary
has been transformed from an enabling tool into an exclusionary
rule. 1' 12 Even as an exclusionary rule, however, the especial beneficiary rationale serves as one method of divining the legislative
purpose.
The fifty years following Rigsby produced relatively few cases
in which the Supreme Court recognized an implied private remedy.
While Justice Powell claimed that the only implication activity
during this time arose out of one "especially strong" line of litigation, 11 3 several decisions that implied remedies in favor of the government were decided during this period.11 4 Also, in a series of
cases the Court implied a broad set of remedies under the Railway
Labor Act of 1926.115 For the most part, however, Powell was corof a statute prohibiting the sale of glue to minors. The expressio unius argument was particularly poignant here since in the Civil Damage Act the legislature had created express Hability in an analagous setting for the illegal sale of liquor. See Ross v. Ross, 294 Minn. 115, 200
N.W.2d 149 (1972). The court in Zerby nevertheless found that the glue sale statute did not
create negligence per se but rather "absolute liability." For a further, related example, see
Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959), in which the court implied a remedy
against a tavern owner for having served an intoxicated patron notwithstanding New
Jersey's repeal of its civil damage act.
112. Pillai, supra note 72, at 23.
113. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 733 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 733 n.3. It must be remembered that the history that follows is limited to
Supreme Court cases and does not include the numerous circuit and lower court decisions
implying private remedies that have been left undisturbed by the Supreme Court. See, e.g.,
Fitzgerald v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 229 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1956) (discrimination in
violation of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938); Reitmeister v. Reitmeister, 162 F.2d 691 (2d
Cir. 1947) (publication of telephone messages in violation of the Federal Communications
Act of 1934); Farmland Indus., Inc. v. Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co., 349 F. Supp. 670
(D. Neb. 1972), af'd, 486 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1973) (violation of Natural Gas Act); Fagot v.
Flintkote Co., 305 F. Supp. 407 (E.D. La. 1969) (retaliatory tactics in violation of the Fair
Labor Standards Act); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946)
(violation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). See text accompanying notes 33-36
supra.
115. As described by Justice Powelh
[T]he Court in Texas & N. 0. R. Co. v. Railway Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930), upheld an
injunction enforcing the Act's prohibition of employer interference in employees' organizational activities .... [T]he Court in Virginia Railway Co. v. Railway Employees
[sic], 300 U.S. 515 (1937), extended judicial enforcement to the Act's requirement that
an employer bargain with its employees' authorized representative. Finally, in Steel v.
Louisville & N.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944), and Thnstall v. Locomotive Firemen &
Enginemen [sic], 323 U.S. 210 (1944), the Court further held that the duty of a union
not to discriminate among its members also could be enforced through the federal
courts.

Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 733-34 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). The Railway Labor Act continued to be an active area for implication. See,
e.g., International Ass'n of Machinists v. Central Airlines, Inc., 372 U.S. 682 (1963); Burke v.
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rect in asserting that the Court was unreceptive to arguments in
favor of implication.1 16 That trend shifted, though, in 1964, almost
fifty years after Rigsby.
In J.L Case Co. v. Borak'17 the Court gave its first express
sanction to an implied remedy under the Securities Exchange Act's
proxy antifraud rules. Following the rationale laid down in Rigsby,
the Court looked to the legislative purpose and identified the "especial beneficiaries" of federal proxy regulation:
The section stemmed from the congressional belief that "[flair corporate suffrage is an important right that should attach to every equity security bought
on a public exchange." H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 13....
[The] broad remedial purposes are evidenced in the language of the section
.... While this language makes no specific reference to a private right of
action, among its chief purposes is "the protection of investors," which certainly implies the availability of judicial relief where necessary to achieve
that result.118

The Court noted the extent to which the SEC's overburdensome
workload precluded effective enforcement of the proxy rules.11 9
Consequently, the Court concluded that "[p]rivate enforcement of
the proxy rules provides a necessary supplement to Commission
action. 1 20 As will be demonstrated below, even under the more
stringent language utilized by the Court in later cases, the Borak
ruling was not an aberration as has been suggested by Justice Powell. 21 Although the Court did not search for express evidence of
congressional intent to support its result, it believed that the legislative scheme on its face, especially when viewed in light of the
statute's underlying purposes, evidenced such an intent. Thus, it is
incorrect to assert, as some have, 22 that the Borak Court ignored
this most important aspect of the Cort test for implying remedies.
In the wake of Borak, the Court in Wyandotte Transportation
Co. v. United States1 23 implied a private remedy under section 15
Compania Mexicana de Aviacion, S.A., 433 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1970).
116. E.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533
(1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Wilkinson, The Supreme Court, The Equal Protection Clause, and the Three Faces of ConstitutionalEquality, 61 VA. L. REV. 945, 956-76
(1975). Cf. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (Stone, J.,

concurring).
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

377 U.S. 426 (1964).
Id. at 431-32.
Id. at 432.
Id.
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 736 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., Comment, supra note 88; Comment, 63 Nw. U.L. REV. 454, 463 (1968).
389 U.S. 191 (1967).
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of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899.124 As had been the case in

Borak, the Wyandotte opinion examined the statute as a whole
and found that the express criminal sanctions were not adequate
"to ensure the full effectiveness of the statute which Congress had
intended.

12 5

The Court also enlarged the scope of the Rigsby espe-

cial plaintiff test by requiring that the injury be "of the type that
the statute was intended to forestall." 112 Although some commentators have categorized the "Borak-Wyandotte approach" as a departure from past practices, 12 7 these two cases appear consistent
with the Court's continued emphasis on both legislative intent and
the focus of the prohibitory provision in question.
If the Borak-Wyandotte emphasis upon the necessity of private remedies to effectuate the statute's purpose is viewed as giving the courts a free hand to supplement statutory remedies, the
principle definitely constitutes a departure from the mainstream
analysis. Given that private remedies will always aid enforcement
of penal statutes, such a reading would remove almost all limitations on the courts' implication authority. Neither Borak nor Wyandotte went this far, however. Both of these decisions were heavily dependent upon a finding of legislative intent. While it was
necessary to both decisions that the implied remedy not thwart the
statutory scheme,12 s such a finding was not, standing alone, sufficient to justify implication. In both cases the Court paid the same
heed to legislative design that is still necessary under Cort and its
progeny.
Following the Borak decision, in 1970 the Court in Mills v.
Electric Auto-Lite Co.12 reaffirmed the breadth of the proxy rules'
private remedy. The next year, in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
130 the Court recognized an
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,
implied remedy against a federal official for violation of a plaintiff's fourth amendment rights. In 1971 the Court also recognized
an implied remedy for violations of SEC rule lOb-5.131 The Court
124.
125.

33 U.S.C. § 409 (1976).
389 U.S. at 202.

126. Id.
127. E.g., Note, Emerging Standardsfor Implied Actions Under FederalStatutes, 9
U. MICH. J.L. REF. 294, 299-301 (1976). See also Cannon v. University of Chicago,'441 U.S.
677, 730 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
128. Cf., e.g., National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414
U.S. 453 (1974), discussed in the text accompanying notes 147-54 infra.
129. 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
130. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
131. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
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reaffirmed the broad scope of the 10b-5 action in the 1972 case of
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States.132 These cases further
demonstrate that Borak cannot accurately be described as an aberration. It should be noted, however, that because of its constitutional base, Bivens has since been placed on a different plane from
statutory implication cases.13s Moreover, Justice Stevens, speaking
for the Court in Cannon, observed that the 10b-5 remedy might be
distinguished because of its twenty-five year history in the lower
courts prior to the Supreme Court's decision.""
The post-Borak period was not limited to simply an increase
in lower court activity. 13 5 The Court itself also began to expand the

focus of its activity to areas beyond the securities laws. In Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer Co.,136 the Court implied private remedies under
the federal Civil Rights Act beyond the individual suits expressly
authorized by section 1983.37 Jones involved a claim against a private party for an injunction to prohibit continued violations of section 1982 of the Act,138 which guarantees nondiscriminatory treatment with respect to property ownership. Although the express
enforcement criteria of section 1983 were not applicable because
the defendant was not a state official,139 the Court upheld the
complaint.
Just one year later the Court reaffirmed the position taken in
Jones with regard to the exclusivity of the express damage remedy
132. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
133. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
134. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 690 n.13 (1979).
135. E.g., Moses v. Burgin, 445 F.2d 369 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 994 (1971);
Burke v. Compania Mexicana de Aviacion, S.A., 433 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1970); Pearlstein v.
Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136 (2d Cir. 1970); Gomez v. Florida State Employment
Serv., 417 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1969); Common Cause v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 333 F.
Supp. 803 (D.D.C. 1971); Fagot v. Flintkote Co., 305 F. Supp. 407 (E.D. La. 1969). See Note,
The Implication of a Private Cause of Action Under Title III of the The Consumer Credit
Protection Act, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 383 (1974).
136. 392 U.S. 409 (1968). In Jones the Court extended the civil remedies under the
federal civil rights acts to cover private parties who violated the plaintiff's rights. Accord,
Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969). See also Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); Note, Implication of Civil
Remedies Under the Indian Civil Rights Act, 75 MICH. L. REv. 210 (1976).
137. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
138. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976). The section guarantees that people "of every race and
color shall have the same right, in every State and Territory of the United States to inherit,
purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey real and personal property as is enjoyed by white
citizens."
139. The Jones decision helped establish that state action under the Civil Rights Acts
was to be given a broad interpretation especially with regard to private party defendants.
392 U.S. at 423-24.
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of section 1983. In Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc.140 the
Court was faced with a claim for both damages and injunctive relief for violations of the guarantees of section 1982. The decision
expanded Jones by explicitly relying upon the implication enabling
language of Rigsby. 4 1 In reaching this result the Court eschewed a
restrictive approach to the implication of private remedies. Similarly, in Allen v. State Board of Elections1 4 the Court recognized
an implied right of action under section five of the Voting Rights
Act of 1965.143
In Rosado v. Wyman 144 the Court was faced with a challenge
to a state welfare program that was allegedly inconsistent with the
Social Security Act Amendments of 1967.145 Although the relevant
statute contained no private remedy and further provided for administrative control by the Secretary of Health, Education, and
Welfare, the Court by-passed the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
and upheld the private plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief. Welfare claims akin to the one in Rosado essentially involve the pro46
tection of civil rights.
While the Court has thus been active in remedying civil rights
and securities violations, it has utilized a more restrained mode of
analysis in other areas. In National Railroad Passenger Corp. v.
National Association of Railroad Passengers14 7-- the Amtrak
case-the Court denied a private party's right to challenge Amtrak's discontinuation of service in light of the express grant of
similar enforcement power to the Attorney General. In Amtrak a
private plaintiff alleged that the discontinuance of certain rail service violated the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 (the Amtrak
Act). 48 In the only portion of the legislation to speak of remedies,
section 307(a) of the Act specifically confers upon federal district
courts enforcement powers upon petition of the Attorney General.1 49 The Court attempted to determine whether there had been
140.
141.
142.

396 U.S. 229 (1969).
Id. at 240.
393 U.S. 544 (1969).

143. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1976).
144. 397 U.S. 397 (1970).
145.
146.

42 U.S.C. § 402(a)(23) (1976).
See, e.g., Note, FederalJudicialReview of State Welfare Practices,67 COLUM. L.

REv. 84 (1967).
147. 414 U.S. 453 (1974).
148. 45 U.S.C. § 501-645 (1976).
149. 45 U.S.C. § 547(a) (1976).
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a legislative intent to imply a remedy "in light of § 307(a)." 150 The
Court pointed to the House of Representatives' rejection of an
amendment to section 307 that would have allowed private actions.1 51 Most important, however, was the Court's conclusion that
a private remedy could "completely undercut" the essence of the
Act by permitting undue prolongation of uneconomical passenger
rail routes. 152 As the Court noted: "Congress clearly did not intend
to replace the delays often inherent in the administrative proceedings contemplated by § 13a of the Interstate Commerce Act with
the probably even
greater delays inherent in multiple federal court
153
proceedings.
Although it has been suggested that the Amtrak case represented a significant retreat from the Court's prior implication rulings, 15 4 that clearly is not so. Even beyond congressional rejection
of a private remedy, the statutory scheme in Amtrak stood to be
thwarted by private litigants. Additionally, in contrast to Rigsby
and its more recent progeny, the Court identified no class distinct
from the public at large for whose "especial benefit" the legislation
had been enacted.
Following on the rails of Amtrak, in Securities Investor Pro15 5 the Court was asked to declare the extection Corp. v. Barbour,
150. 414 U.S. at 455.
151. Id. at 460-61.
152. Id. at 463-64 (footnote omitted):
If the respondent's view of the Act were to prevail, a private plaintiff could secure
injunctive process to prevent the discontinuance of an "uneconomic" passenger train
pendente lite, which would force Amtrak to continue the train's operation and to incur
the resulting deficits and dislocations within its entire system while the court considered the propriety of the proposed discontinuance. Since suits could be brought in any
district through which Amtrak trains pass and since there would be a myriad of possible plaintiffs, the potential would exist for a barrage of lawsuits that, either individually or collectively, could frustrate or severely delay any proposed passenger train discontinuance. Even if one court eventually upheld the discontinuance, its judgment
would not control a suit brought in another district and would not, in any event, obviate the loss in the interim of substantial sums and the diversion of rolling stock from
more heavily traveled routes. This would completely undercut the efficient apparatus
that Congress sought to provide for Amtrak to use in the "paring of uneconomic
routes." It would also produce the anomalous result of a discontinuance procedure
under the Act considerably less efficient than that which existed before, since there
would no longer be a single forum that could finally determine the permissibility of a
proposed discontinuance. In the place of the state or federal regulatory bodies, the
Congress would have substituted any and all federal district courts through whose jurisdictions an Amtrak train might run.
153. Id. at 464 (footnote omitted).
154. See Comment, supra note 88, at 62.
155. 421 U.S. 412 (1975).
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istence of a private remedy under the Securities Investor Protection Act (SIPA)156 against the Securities Investor Protection
Corporation (SIPC), the entity formed to protect the interests of
customers of bankrupt stock brokerage houses. As in Amtrak, the
recognition of the asserted private right of action in Barbourwould
in a very strong sense have thwarted the goal of the legislation by
allowing courts to impede administrative procedures provided by
the Act. On its face the Barbour decision rested upon the doctrine
of primary jurisdiction.1 57 As such the Court merely echoed the approach it had taken sixteen years earlier in T.LM.E.5 8 Barbour
thus reflected Amtrak's deference to administrative determination
of the relevant issue.
In contrast to the administrative schemes involved in T.I.M.E.
and Amtrak, the Securities Act of 1933 and the 1934 Securities
Exchange Act do not grant the SEC a similar basis of dispute resolution. Accordingly, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not
have a role when the antifraud provisions of those statutes are considered. There were, however, additional justifications for rejection
in Barbour of a private remedy under the SIPA. The Court placed
considerable emphasis upon the congressional formulation and
suggested that the primary responsibility for enacting an enforcement scheme rests with Congress. Speaking for the BarbourCourt,
Justice Marshall quickly dismissed the relevance of prior implication cases:
We need not pause long over the distinctions between this case and
those, such as [Borak] ....
[In Borak the Court] concluded that it was "clear that private parties
have a right under § 27 [of the Act] to bring suit for violation of §
14(a)"....
Unlike the Securities Exchange Act, the SIPA contains no standards of

156. 15 U.S.C. § 78ggg(b) (1971) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 78ggg(b) (1980)).
157. The Court maintained thatthe SIPC avoids unnecessarily engendering the costs of precipitate liquidations [of
stock brokerage firms]-the costs not only of administering the liquidation, but also of
customer illiquidity and additional loss of confidence in the capital markets-without
sacrifice of any customer protection that may ultimately prove necessary. A customer,
by contrast, cannot be expected to consider, or have adequate information to consider,
these public interests in timing his decision to apply to the courts.
421 U.S. at 422, See also Note, Administrative Law-PrimaryJurisdiction:The Misuse of
Primary JurisdictionRetroactively to Extinguish a Tort Remedy: Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 512 F.2d 527 (D.C. Cir. 1975), 8 CONN. L. REV. 584 (1976); Comment, Private
Rights of Action Under Amtrak and Ash. Some Implicationsfor Implication, 123 U. PA. L.
REv. 1392, 1433-34 (1975). See generally Convisser, PrimaryJurisdiction:The Rule and its
Rationalizations,65 YALz L.J. 315 (1956).
158. 359 U.S. 464 (1959). See text accompanying notes 99-101 supra.
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conduct that a private action could help to enforce, and it contains no general

grant of jurisdiction to the district courts.15

The Barbour decision thus found an absence of the requisite legislative intent to create a private remedy. Additionally, congressional
failure to include a general grant of federal judicial jurisdiction
may have been the most compelling ground for denying relief.160 In
sum, as was the case in Amtrak the SIPA legislative scheme on its
face belied the existence of an implied private remedy. The Court
was thus loathe to invade an area it considered left to legislative
prerogative.
After the Amtrak and Barbourdecisions the implication issue
became more clearly drawn. With the exception of the more expansive approach taken in the securities and civil rights areas, the
Court was retreating from the more expansive Rigsby-HewittRobins method of analysis. The result was a great deal of uncertainty as to the Court's true attitude toward implication. The time
was thus ripe for a clearer articulation of the standards for
analysis.
V. Cort v. Ash

AND THE RECENT SUPREME COURT REFINEMENTS

A.

The Cort Test

It was against the background of seemingly cyclical expansion
and retrenchment of its approach to implication that the Supreme
Court unveiled its current method of analysis. Cort v. Ash 61
presented a four factor test for the implication of private remedies
from federal prohibitory statutes. At issue in Cort was a shareholders' derivative action against corporate directors to recover corporate expenditures allegedly made in violation of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971.162 In denying the availability of a

private remedy, the Court attempted to synthesize its prior rulings
and discerned a four-pronged test from their holdings:
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute
was enacted," Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916) (emphasis supplied)-that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of
the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or
implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one? See, e.g., National
159. 421 U.S. at 423-24.
160. This is a critical distinction between Barbour and Borak, as far as the implication
issue is concerned; furthermore, the general jurisdictional provision is a crucial element in
setting the stage for the development of federal common law. See Part VI infra.
161. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
162. Law of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 723 (repealed 1976).
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RailroadPassengerCorp. v. National Assn. of RailroadPassengers,414 U.S.
453, 458, 460 (1974) (Amtrak). Third, is it consistent with the underlying
purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff?.

See, e.g., Amtrak, supra;SecuritiesInvestor Protection Corp. v. Barbour,421
U.S. 412, 423 (1975); Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134 (1964). And finally, is
the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a
cause of action based solely on federal law? See Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373
U.S. 647, 652 (1963); cf. J.L Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 434 (1964);

Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 394-395
(1971); id., at 400 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment).les

While the first three factors in the test follow directly from the
implication cases cited by the Court, the fourth had never been
explicitly considered by the Court before its decision in Cort. As
will be developed more fully below, the Supreme Court cases that
have followed Cort have placed considerable emphasis upon this
notion of federalism. The fear of undue federalization has been especially acute in the context of securities regulation, in which both
state and federal statutes govern various aspects of corporate conduct. The task for the courts in considering such legislation has
been to avoid a conflict between the federal and state spheres of
influence."' Indeed, the Cort facts themselves raised the possibility of undue incursion by federal law upon state regulation of corporate governance. While the Cort test, then, does not provide a
fool-proof formula by which to predict the success or failure of all
implication claims, it does present definite guidelines for analysis.
Moreover, it provides a useful indication of the current thinking of
the Court.
Following Cort, a trio of decisions addressing prohibited corporate conduct utilized the same federalism concerns to justify a
limitation on the scope of the rule 10b-5 implied remedy. In Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores6 5 the Court limited use of the
private damage remedy to purchasers or sellers of securities. Although acknowledging that the 10b-5 right of action was consistent
with the Borak rationale,' 66 Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the
163. 422 U.S. at 78.
164. The tension that exists in securities regulation is between the state interest in
chartering corporate franchises and the federal securities acts' goal of investor protection.
The recent Supreme Court cases under the securities acts can be viewed not so much as an
across-the-board narrowing of private remedies and the acts' impact in general but rather as
an attempt to balance the competing state and federal interests. See Hazen, Corporate

Chartering and the Securities Markets: Shareholder Suffrage, Corporate Responsibility
and ManagerialAccountability, 1978 Wis. L. REv. 391.
165. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
166. Id. at 729-31.
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majority, pointed to the need for clarification of the parameters of
the remedy that had been significantly expanded in twenty-five
years of district and circuit court decisions.""1 As a result, the
Court, couching its retrenchment in terms of the pruning of a judicial oak, limited the 10b-5 remedy to meet the needs of the "especial" beneficiaries of that section's antifraud provisions. 68 After
Blue Chip the Court further restricted the scope of the 10b-5 remedy by requiring in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder6 9 that the private
plaintiff prove that the defendant acted with scienter. In Ernst &
Ernst the Court again expressed concern that the 10b-5 remedy
had grown too fast within a short period of time. The Court viewed
the scienter requirement as necessary to keep the private remedy
in line with the congressional purpose of investor protection without unduly burdening the market place.
To complete the trilogy, in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v.
Green1 70 the Court reversed the Second Circuit's grant of a 10b-5
remedy due to the plaintiff's failure to allege an act of deception
arising out of the defendant's conduct. The Santa Fe decision is
especially significant due to its application of the fourth prong of
the Cort test. The Court first noted that standards of corporate
conduct and the correlative rules of fiduciary duty have long been
relegated to state corporate law.""' In refusing to recognize a federal remedy when the defendant's conduct complied with applicable state law, the Court declined to "impose a stricter standard of
17
fiduciary duty than that required by the law of some States."
In Piper v. Chris-CraftIndustries,Inc.1 7 8 the Court, as it had
done in Blue Chip Stamps, picked up on the first prong of the
Cort test by reemphasizing Rigsby's requirement that the legislation be directed toward a special class of persons. In Piper the
plaintiff, an unsuccessful tender offeror, sought damages from the
victor in the control battle. The claim, relying on the antifraud
provisions of section 14(e), l7 4 was that the defendants' violative
167. Id. at 737.
168. This refinement becofnes clearer in the Court's holding that a competing tender
offeror does not have standing to bring an implied action under § 14(e) of the Act. See Piper
v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977), discussed in the text accompanying notes 17375 infra.
169. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).

170. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
171. Id. at 479.
172.
173.
174.

Id. at n.16.
430 U.S. 1 (1977).
15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976) provides:
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misstatements and manipulation assured their successes in the
takeover battle. The Court identified the focus of the Williams Act
disclosure and antifraud provisions as "seeking to broaden the
scope of protection afforded to shareholders confronted with competing claims.

17 5

Because the plaintiff was a competing offeror

rather than a shareholder of the target company, it was ruled not
to be a member of the "especial" class that the Act was designed to
protect; consequently, the cause of action was denied. Although
Piperclearly presents a restrictive view of implication, the decision
is not a throw back to the expressio unius analysis, for the majority's rationale virtually invites recognition of a remedy in the
hands of shareholders of the target company.
The foregoing securities cases, while helping to establish the
viability of the Cort approach, actually did little to clarify the specific requirements of the four-part test. Most significantly, all four
cases were limiting rather than enabling decisions. By the same token, the most recent round of implication cases, which span several
substantive areas, also present a limiting trend. The recent decisions demonstrate that the Cort test survives and further that it is
not a death knell for implication. There is, however, without
doubt, a strong message to the lower federal courts that remedies
should not be lightly implied without close scrutiny of legislative
intent, statutory purpose, and federal/state tensions. The scorecard
for the 1979 Supreme Court cases highlights the uncertainty that
remains. Of the five cases, two denied any private remedy, two recognized a basis for implied relief, and one, while recognizing a constitutional remedy, ruled Cort inapplicable.
B. Recent Supreme Court Refinements
Examination of the five recent Supreme Court cases reveals
ample evidence that the Cort test survives as at least one basis for
the recognition of an implied right of action. In Cannon v. Univer(e) It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a material
fact or omit to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements made,
in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading, or to
engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, in connection
with any tender offer or request or invitation for tenders, or any solicitation of security
holders in opposition to or in favor of any such offer, request, or invitation. The Commission shall, for the purposes of this subsection, by rules and regulations define, and
prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent, such acts and practices as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative.
175. 430 U.S. at 34.
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sity of Chicago,17 6 the plaintiff filed a complaint against two medical schools, alleging violations of Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972,177 which bans sex discrimination in all federally aided programs and institutions. The Supreme Court reversed
the lower court's 78 denial of a private damage remedy in a decision
written by Justice Stevens, joined by three other members of the
Court. Explicitly following the Cort rationale, the opinion distinguished other recent cases by finding the plaintiff to be within the
statute's "especial" class:
The language in these statutes-which expressly identifies the class Congress intended to benefit-contrasts sharply with statutory language customarily found in criminal statutes, such as that construed in Cort, supra, and
other laws enacted for the protection of the general public. There would be
far less reason to infer a private remedy in favor of individual persons if Congress, instead of drafting Title IX with an unmistakable focus on the benefited class, had written it simply as a ban on discriminatory conduct by recipients of federal funds or as a prohibition against the disbursement of public
funds to educational institutions engaged in discriminatory practices.179

The impact of Cannon can be fully evaluated only by examination
of the concurring and dissenting opinions as well as the line-up of
the nine Justices. Although both joined in the Court's ruling, Justices Rehnquist and Stewart felt it necessary to make "explicit
what seems. . . already implicit in that opinion," namely that "in
176. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
177. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1978) provides that "[n]o person in the United States shall,
on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance . .. ."

178. 406 F. Supp. 1257 (N.D. Ill.
1976).
179. 441 U.S. at 690-93 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis supplied). Justice Stevens went
on to identify the private remedies under § 14(a) and rule 10b-5 of the 1934 Securities
Exchange Act as deviations from the pattern of limiting implied remedies to statutes "where
the language of the statute explicitly conferred a right directly on a class of persons that
included the plaintiff. . . ." Id. at 690 n.13. As noted earlier, it was further observed that
the 10b-5 result can be explained as having an historical basis since the federal courts had
recognized the remedy for 25 years. Furthermore, in his dissent in Cannon Justice Powell
characterized Borak as an aberration. It would appear that the historical basis alone is too
flimsy to warrant a continuation of the expansive liability that exists under 10b-5 and 14(a).
Similarly, a closer look at Stevens' analysis shows that these cases are not aberrational.
Stevens' characterization of the Borak and Bankers Life decisions is not that they arose
under statutes directed to the general public, but rather that the "especial" benefited class
was not expressly singled out on the statute's face, a fact the presence of which has been the
most accurate indicator of congressional intent. In Borak and Bankers Life, as well as in
Piper, the Court had to look beyond the statute to identify the "especial" class but found
the legislative history sufficiently convincing. The lesson to be learned here is that in future
cases, without the express statutory designation that existed in Cannon, the plaintiff will
have to be well armed with clear and convincing legislative history in order to justify
implication.
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the future [courts] should be extremely reluctant to imply a cause
of action." 18 0 Chief Justice Burger joined in the Court's opinion,
providing a majority of four. It should be noted, however, that the
two non-participating Justices-Brennan and Marshall-have long
been very receptive to a more liberal approach to implication.18 '
Therefore, the Cannon rationale was not as closely contested as
the four to three division might otherwise indicate.
In his dissent Justice White, joined by Justice Blackmun,
found evidence that Congress intended the administrative mechanism of Title IX to be the only means of enforcement. White contrasted the language of Title IX with the express private remedies
contained in other civil rights statutes."s2 While this approach
might be viewed as advocating a return to the doctrine of expressio
unius, even a literal interpretation of White's opinion cannot go
this far. There can be no doubt that the existence of private remedies in parallel legislative schemes will be a significant negativing
factor in implication cases; 8 3 however, as Cannon demonstrates,
18
this is not in itself determinative. 4
In his vociferous dissent in Cannon, Justice Powell expressed
his view that implication should never be the rule. After noting
that in the four years since Cort there had been at least twenty
circuit court opinions recognizing implied actions, Powell considered it time to "reexamine the Cort analysis."' 8 5 Powell charged
that the Cort analysis should be abandoned because it permits a
court to determine the desirability of private enforcement using its
own expansive views rather than the intent of Congress. As strong
as Powell's views may be, however, it is clear that he stands as a
minority of one. Cort is still the rule and thus the implication process, although significantly refined, has not-and should
not-come to a halt. Furthermore, Cannon, as the first case after
Cort clearly to uphold a new private remedy, expands upon the
traditional utilization of an implied action to protect individual
and civil rights. The decision demonstrates that, even in its most
conservative stance, the Court continues to recognize remedies in
180. 441 U.S. at 717-18 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
181. E.g., Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979) (Brennan, J., concurring; Marshall, J., dissenting); Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 653 (1963) (Brennan, J.,

dissenting).
182.

441 U.S. at 719-23 (White, J., dissenting). See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).

183. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
184. See also Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979);
Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977). See note 100 supra.
185.

441 U.S. at 742 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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the civil rights area.
An unsuccessful attempt to imply a private remedy had been
made in Chrysler Corp. v. Brown,"8 6 which was decided less than
one month prior to Cannon. In Brown, the plaintiff Chrysler Corporation sued to enjoin disclosure of information that it had given
the Defense Logistics Agency concerning Chrysler's employment of
minorities and women. The plaintiff based its claim alternatively
on the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)18 7 and the Trade
Secrets Act.'18 The Court unanimously denied both remedies. With
respect to FOIA the Court emphasized that it is "exclusively a disclosure statute,"'189 thus distinguishing it from the prohibitory legislation out of which implication normally arises. 190 Additionally,
the Court held that neither act was intended to benefit a special
class of persons. Finally, the Court relied upon the absence of any
congressional intent in FOIA to limit agencies'
discretion to dis19
'
information.
withhold
than
rather
close
Brown is instructive for two reasons. First, neither the Trade
Secrets Act nor FOIA were enacted for the benefit of any special
class; instead, like the campaign contribution act at issue in Cort,
both acts serve to protect the general public. Consequently, Brown
was not a departure from the expansive trend in civil rights implication litigation. Second, Brown repeated the Court's earlier concerns for the proper role of the statutorily created administrative
agency. As was the case in T.I.M.E. and Amtrak, recognition of the
plaintiff's claim in Brown would have thwarted the congressional
purpose of letting the matter rest with the agency, subject to normal channels for judicial review.
Shortly after Brown and Cannon, the Court held in Davis v.
Passman9 2 that the Cort analysis was too restrictive and should be
disregarded when implying a federal right of action from the Constitution as opposed to a statute. The four-member dissent, following the Fifth Circuit's opinion below,'9 " urged strict adherence to
the Cort test. Accordingly, contrary to the position urged by Powell in his Cannon dissent, Davis can be properly categorized as a
186. 441 U.S. 281 (1979).
187. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).
188. 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976).
189. 441 U.S. at 292.
190. Accord, Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
191. 441 U.S. at 293. See Note, Reverse FOIA Suits After Chrysler: A New Direction,
48 FORDHAM L. REV. 185 (1979).
192. 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
193. 571 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. 1978).
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further reaffirmation of Cort's continued vitality in appropriate
cases (i.e., those dealing with statutory implication). Davis logically
extends the rationale of Bivens and Cannon by allowing additional
flexibility with respect to constitutional implication and in cases
involving civil rights.
The final two cases considered by the Court in 1979 arose
under the federal securities laws, with one denying and one recognizing a private remedy. In Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington194 the
Court was asked to recognize a private remedy under section 17(a)
of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act.'9 5 The Court pointed out that
the section was literally flanked by the express liability provisions
of sections 16(b) and 18(a). 116 Even more significant was the fact
that section 17(a), like the legislation involved in Brown, is purely
an affirmative disclosure statute with no prohibitory provisions.
This is in sharp contrast to the antifraud provisions that have
formed the basis of the recognized implied remedies under the securities acts. Clearly, it is one thing for Congress to mandate the
public availability of information and quite another to directly
prohibit certain types of conduct-whether fraud or discrimination-that is directed towards a certain class of persons. Interestingly, a suggested dichotomy between prohibitory statutes and
those mandating action is far from new, as it dates back to Dean
Thayer's writings. 97
In its opinion in Touche Ross, the Court reemphasized that
implication does not come easily: "The ultimate question is one of
congressional intent, not one of whether this Court thinks that it
can improve upon the statutory scheme that Congress enacted into
law." 98 Simply put, the Touche Ross decision does no more than
deny courts the right to ignore willy-nilly the underlying statutory
scheme. It should be interpreted properly as a call for greater consideration of the overall legislative history rather than as merely a
cue for the courts to stop implying remedies. The most recent of
the Supreme Court decisions on point exemplifies this tempered
approach.
In Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis 9 ' the
194.
195.
196.
197.

442 U.S. at 562.
15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1976).
442 U.S. at 571-72.
Thayer proposed that it was the violation of prohibiting statutes that constituted

negligence per se. Thayer, supra note 11.
198. 442 U.S. at 578.
199. 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
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Court denied the existence of a private damage action under the
antifraud proscription contained in section 206(a) of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940.200 At the same time, however, the
Court was willing to imply an equitable action for rescission of prohibited contracts under section 215 of the same Act.2 01 This bifur-

cated result demonstrates beyond any question that the implication process has not been brought to a halt.
Following its earlier teachings, the Court in Transamericafirst
set out to ascertain the legislative intent. Although the history of
the Act was entirely silent on the issue of whether Congress intended that the provisions of the Act would be enforced through
private litigation, 02 the Court noted that "[s]uch an intent may
appear implicitly in the language or structure of the statute, or in
the circumstances of its enactment." 203 Significantly, this was an
emphatic rejection of the expressio unius mode of analysis that
may have appeared in some of the Court's other recent implication
decisions. After reaffirming the teachings of Cort, the Transamerica Court, in a five-to-four decision, concluded that there was inadequate evidence of congressional intent to provide a private remedy for violations of the Investment Advisors Act's antifraud
provisions. The Court was confronted with language in the 1940
legislation that expressly provided a mechanism for judicial and
administrative enforcement. Given that statutory pattern, the
Court concluded, it was highly unlikely that Congress somehow neglected to include a private damage action.20 4 In contrast, both the
200.
201.

15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1976).
15 U.S.C. § 80b-15 (1976). For a recent application of this aspect of the decision

to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, see Marrero v. Banco di Roma (Chicago), [Current
Binder] Fan. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)

97,584 (E.D. La. April 8, 1980) (recognizing a remedy

under § 29(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1976)). See generally Gruenbaum & Steinberg, Section 29(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: A
Viable Remedy Awakened, 48 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 1 (1979).

202.

"[T]he legislative history of the Act is entirely silent-a state of affairs not sur-

prising when it is remembered that the Act concededly does not explicitly provide any pri-

vate remedies whatever." 444 U.S. at 18.
203. Id.
204. We view quite differently, however, the respondent's claims for damages and
other monetary relief under § 206. Unlike § 215, § 206 simply proscribes certain conduct, and does not in terms create or alter any civil liabilities. If monetary liability to a
private plaintiff is to be found, it must be read into the Act. Yet it is an elemental
canon of statutory construction that where a statute expressly provides a particular
remedy or remedies, a court must be chary of reading others into it. "When a statute
limits a thing to be done in a particular mode, it includes the negative of any other
mode." Congress expressly provided both judicial and administrative means for enforcing compliance with § 206. First, under § 217 willful violations of the Act are criminal
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Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
contain express damage remedies in addition to general antifraud
proscriptions.
With regard to section 215 of the 1940 Act, the Transamerica
Court began its analysis by examining the face of the statute and
reasoned that "[b]y declaring certain contracts void, § 215 by its
terms necessarily contemplates that the issue of voidness . . .be
litigated somewhere." 0 5 The Court then carefully examined both
prior cases that implied a right to rescind based upon similar statutory language and general principles of contract law. The Court
concluded that Congress intended that aggrieved parties have
available an equitable remedy in rescission as a means of having
the contract declared void. In relying so heavily on precedent and
legislative history the Court seemed to couch its ruling in the
broad terms of common-law principles, as had been the case in the
seminal 10b-5 Kardon decision.0 8 In light of the elimination of
federal common law by Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, °7 the
Transamerica Court could not merely apply the general law of
contracts; therefore, it viewed the 1940 Act as creating a federal
private law of investment advisory contracts. In a manner consistent with both Cort and Cannon, the Court stressed legislative history in order to emphasize the interrelationship of the several Cort
factors in this instance.20 While Transamerica could arguably be
limited to rescission and other equitable remedies, the Court's reaffirmation of the Cort rationale negates such a result. In fact, the
Transamericaresult could easily be utilized in the future to recognize a federal remedy for damages resulting from conduct that
voids an advisory contract.
The Transamerica and Cannon decisions, then, represent a
continuation of the Court's efforts to imply private remedies in
cases in which the four Cort factors seem clearly applicable. In
offenses, punishable by fine or imprisonment, or both. Second, § 209 authorizes the
Commission to bring civil actions in federal courts to enjoin compliance with the Act,
including, of course, § 206. Third, the Commission is authorized by § 203 to impose
various administrative sanctions on persons who violate the Act, including § 206. In
view of these express provisions for enforcing the duties imposed by § 206, it is highly
improbable that "Congress absentmindedly forgot to mention an intended private
action."
Id. at 19-20 (citations omitted).
205. 444 U.S. at 18.
206. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946); see text accompanying notes 33-36 supra. Interestingly, in so ruling, the Court expressly reaffirmed the validity of the Kardon decision.
207. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
208. 444 U.S. at 20-21.
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both instances the Court applied the Cort analysis and demonstrated its continued vitality. Moreover, while the Touche Ross
and Brown decisions represent denials of private relief, they are
readily distinguishable because of the express statutory design in
each situation. Indeed, while many recent cases at the circuit court
level deny the existence of private remedies, others have shown no
reluctance to imply such remedies when to do so would further the
congressional intent or statutory policy. As a result, these recent
cases demonstrate neither a coolness toward nor an encouragement
of private remedies. Therefore, the balanced approach encouraged
by Cort seems to remain intact. An examination of several of these
recent decisions, then, is useful to illustrate Cort's continued
vitality.
C. Recent Circuit Court Applications
As pointed out in the preceding section, the recent Supreme
Court decisions reaffirm the vitality of Cort in statutory implication cases. The opinions further have given conflicting signals as to
the Court's attitude toward implication in general. It is therefore
not surprising that a number of lower federal courts have proceeded with great caution. Even under this cautious approach,
however, it is clear that the implication process survives. This is
evident not only from the decisions recognizing implied remedies,
but also from examination of those instances in which the cause of
action is denied. The discussion that follows provides a representative sampling of recent circuit court rulings.
In Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc.,20' the Fifth Circuit held that section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,210 which provides that

all federal contracts in excess of $2,500 must contain a provision
requiring the contractor to "take affirmative action to employ and
advance in employment qualified handicapped individuals," does
not create a private right of action to remedy alleged discrimination against the handicapped by federal contractors. As the first
federal appeals court to rule on the issue, the Rogers court began
its analysis by noting that:
Our obligation is to determine, to the best of our abilities, whether Congress
intended to create the private right of action plaintiffs seek to bring in fed209. 611 F.2d 1074 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. filed, No. 79-1810 (May 14, 1980). See also
Caceres Agency, Inc. v. Trans World Airways, Inc., 594 F.2d 932 (2d Cir. 1979) (denying a

private remedy under the Federal Aviation Act for preferential commissions paid to competing travel agents).
210. 29 U.S.C. § 793 (1976).
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eral court; even were we satisfied that some of the Cort factors supported
implying such a right, we could not do so if unconvinced that Congress intended such a remedy [citing Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis,
444 U.S. 11 (1979) and Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560
(1979)].211

The court then explained that the analytical framework established in Cort "is primarily a guide for the process of statutory
212
construction.
In applying the four-step analysis laid down in Cort, the court
in Rogers rejected as "facile" the argument that, because Congress
had the handicapped in mind when it passed the act, an implied
right of action under section 503 automatically follows. Instead,
the court contended that the section provides no more than a right
to petition federal agencies to carry out their duty to ensure that
contractors take affirmative steps in employing and advancing the
handicapped.2 3" The court further stressed that the legislative history failed to suggest any congressional intent to create a private
remedy.2 4 In the court's opinion the fact that Congress had expressly provided a complete administrative scheme to remedy section 503 violations and that HEW implementing regulations provided explicit details for the operation of the administrative plan
"create[d] at least some basis to conclude that a private right of
action would be inconsistent with the purposes of the legislative
scheme."2 1 5 The lack of any provision in the regulations for a private cause of action suggested to the court "that a private judicial
remedy may be difficult to harmonize with the administrative enforcement framework. 21 6 As was the case in the Supreme Court
decisions in Amtrak and Barbour, the statute contemplated administrative rather than judicial avenues of dispute resolution.
The same court's decision in Camenisch v. University of
Texas21 7 was in harmony with the decisions of all federal courts of
appeal that have faced the issue of whether section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973218 implies a private right of action to redress discrimination against handicapped persons in federally assisted programs. The Act provides that no otherwise qualified
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

611 F.2d at 1078.
Id. at 1078 n.4.
Id. at 1079.
Id. at 1080-84.
Id. at 1084.
Id.
616 F.2d 127 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3295 (1980).
29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976).
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handicapped individual shall, because of his handicap, be excluded
from, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance. In upholding the district court's grant of injunctive relief,
the Camenisch court ruled in favor of a deaf graduate student who
claimed that the Act required the University of Texas to provide
him with and pay for a sign language interpreter. In addition, the
court determined that plaintiff, in order to be entitled to injunctive
relief, was not required to exhaust the administrative procedures
adopted by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to
implement the Act.2 1' The court, however, made it clear that the
right of action being recognized provided only for equitable relief
and not for damages. Consequently, the court expressly reserved
judgment on the question of whether section 504 created a private
right of action in suits for damages.220
It is important to note the two major bases for the Fifth Circuit's decision in Camenisch. First, the legislative history of section
504 reveals an explicit congressional intent to create a private right
of action, and such a right is consistent with the purposes of the
statute.2 21 Second, with regard to the argument that plaintiff had
not exhausted his administrative remedies, the court pointed out
that the administrative procedures adopted for enforcement of section 504 are not the final consolidated procedural enforcement regulations that are applicable to all civil rights statutes. 222 The court
noted that the HEW administrative procedures in question were
not even relevant to private actions for injunctive relief. The administrative framework, the court found, was designed to allow
HEW to monitor and, if necessary, terminate federal funds of
grant recipients who do not comply with the Act.223 The court concluded that since the HEW administrative procedures do not provide for specific vindication of personal rights, an exhaustion requirement would be inappropriate. Unlike Rogers, Amtrak, and
Barbour, the recognition of an implied private remedy furthered
rather than frustrated the administrative regime. Furthermore,
since HEW had adopted the same regulations to enforce section
504 as it promulgated to enforce Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, the court's holding shared the same rationale as the
219.

616 F.2d at 134.

220.
221.

Id. at 131 n.4, 132 n.10.
Id. at 131.

222. Id. at 134.
223.

Id. at 135.
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Supreme Court's decision in Cannon, which arguably may have
recognized a cause of action only for injunctive relief.
Other federal circuits have also recently shown a hesitancy to
recognize implied rights of action. For example, both the First and
Eighth Circuits refused to infer private remedies from federal
housing statutes. In the First Circuit case, Falzarano v. United
States, 24 tenants of federally subsidized housing projects challenged excessive rents and unsafe conditions, claiming that the
landlords were siphoning funds from the projects. The court stated
that the suit could not be based upon 12 U.S.C. § 17151(d)(3),
which merely proscribes mortgages in excess of the legally permissible per unit limit. An analysis of the Cort factors was central to
the case. In Cedar-Riverside Associates v. City of Minneapolis,2' 5
the Eighth Circuit also heavily relied upon Cort to hold that no
private remedy existed under the National Housing Act of 1949. In
Cedar-Riverside, developers of an urban renewal project claimed
that a city unlawfully made changes in the development plan and
diverted federal funds to other projects. The court noted that, even
assuming that a city has an obligation under 42 U.S.C. § 1441 to
exercise its power consistently with the Housing Act, the statute
was not enacted for the "especial benefit" of developers and contains no indication of legislative intent to create a right of action. 226 Furthermore, the court claimed, the existence of a private
right of action would predictably lead to many suits against local
housing authorities, thus thwarting the legislative scheme to upgrade the nation's housing.2 '7 The court also found that although
the developer's essential claim was based on tortious conduct, tort
is traditionally a state-law matter. 28 The Eighth Circuit's reasoning is further evidence that the Cort test does not herald a new
wave of federal remedies.
In another recent case, Taylor v. Brighton Corp.,22 9 the Sixth
Circuit held that section 11(c) of the Occupational Safety and
Health Act does not explicitly create a private right of action to
redress retaliatory discharges of employees who report safety violations. The case arose after three employees complained to the Secretary of Labor about alleged retaliatory discharges. The Secretary
224. 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir. 1979).
225. 606 F.2d 254 (8th Cir. 1979).
226. Id. at 257.
227. Id. at 258.
228.
229.

Id.
616 F.2d 256 (6th Cir. 1980).
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notified two of the employees of his intent not to file suit based on
their complaints and took no action with regard to the third employee's case. Thereafter, the employees filed suit in the district
court and raised several allegations, the principal one being that
the employer had acted in violation of section 11(c) of the Act.
Dismissal of all claims except that relating to race discrimination
was granted by the district court, which ruled that there was not a
private right of action for employee complaints under section
23 0
11(c).
The Sixth Circuit, relying upon Cort, considered the four familiar criteria in determining whether section 11(c) creates a private right of action. It found that the complaint satisfied two of
the criteria: the employees were members of a class of persons that
the statute intended to benefit, and retaliatory discharge actions
were federal, as opposed to state, concerns.2 31 The court held, however, that the OSH Act's legislative history indicated Congress' intent to deny a private right of action.
In evaluating the fourth of the Cort factors, the Taylor court
pointed initially to the statutory language of section 11(c), which
made no mention of private enforcement and clearly provided that
the Secretary of Labor bring the action after making an initial determination of its merits. The court maintained that the development of the legislation in the Senate indicated Congress' intent
that suits by the Secretary of Labor be exclusive in dealing with
retaliatory discharge cases.232
The court noted that the Senate Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare originally provided employees with the opportunity
for a public hearing on the record related to the alleged violation
and a right to appeal an adverse decision in a court of appeals.
This section was changed, however, by the full Senate to a version
similar to the present one, which provided only that the Secretary
investigate and notify the Review Commission of meritorious complaints. The Senate's version was adopted subject to amendments
that specified that the Secretary was to prosecute actions in the
district court as opposed to the Review Commission. This "legislative narrowing" indicated Congress' intent to deny alternative remedies, the court stated. 2 3 The court also rejected the Secretary of
Labor's argument that a private right of action should be implied
230.
231.
232.
233.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

257-58.
258.
259.
262.
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due to lack of sufficient access by individuals to the courts. The
court maintained that the Secretary must obtain a legislative
amendment in order to guarantee a private right of action.2 '
Needless to say, the key to the Taylor decision is not a new approach to implication, but rather a finding of legislative intent to
deny an implied remedy.
As indicated earlier, the Fifth Circuit has been more inclined
than some courts to trim back implied actions under federal statutes. In Frito-Lay the court disagreed with other federal circuits
by refusing to imply a private remedy under the 1973 Rehabilitation Act. The court has also taken issue with the Seventh Circuit
by denying a private cause of action for construction workers
under the Davis-Bacon Act. In United States v. Capeletti Brothers, Inc.,35 the court heavily relied upon Cort, and placed particular emphasis upon the recent Supreme Court cases. The court emphasized not only the issue of intent to benefit a special class but
also the question of whether Congress sought to create a federal
right of action in the statute. The court noted that the Act authorizes the government to deny funds from contractors who fail to
pay prevailing wages.2 36 Furthermore, the legislation permits the

Comptroller General to furnish back wages to employees who have
had their pay wrongfully withheld. The court also stressed that the
Act provides for federal suits based on Miller Act bond requirements. Given that enforcement mechanism, the court concluded,
the congressional intent was that the express remedies be
exclusive.'
Several other recent circuit court opinions have, on the other
hand, rejected the Fifth Circuit's approach and continue to uphold
private damage remedies. This is especially true for actions
brought under the securities acts and related laws. For example,
both the Second and the Sixth Circuits have implied a private action under the Commodity Exchange Act. In Leist v. SiMplot18
the Second Circuit maintained that Congress' 1974 addition of ad234.
235.
236.

Id. at 264.
621 F.2d 1309 (5th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 1315.

237. Id.
238. 2 COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 1 21,051 (2d Cir. 1980). Accord, e.g., Smith v.
Groover, 468 F. Supp. 105 (N.D. IMI.1979). Contra, e.g., Mullis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., [Current Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 97,570 (D. Nev. July 1,
1980). See also Zeffiro v. First Pa. Banking & Trust Co., 623 F.2d 290 (3d Cir. 1980) (recognizing an implied action under the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77vvv(b),

77www) (1976).
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ministrative remedies to the Act did not alter a long-standing policy of judicial implication. The court followed Cort, and emphasized the second test-whether there is any indication of legislative
intent to create or deny a private remedy. After an examination of
the legislative history of the 1974 amendment, the court found
"overwhelming" evidence that Congress had acknowledged the existence of uniform judicial recognition of private remedies before
1974.239 The court concluded that it was "unimaginable" that, in

light of a half century of securities regulation, Congress intended
the 1974 provision to be exclusive.240 Most importantly, the court
remarked that recent Supreme Court decisions that have limited
implied rights of action simply "emphasize that the ultimate
touchstone is congressional intent and not judicial notions of what
41
2
would constitute wise policy.

The recent decisions, then, indicate considerable disagreement
among the courts as to the proper role of implied private remedies
in statutory enforcement schemes. Although this disagreement certainly demonstrates no overwhelming sentiment on the part of the
courts to embrace implied remedies indiscriminately, it should, by
the same token, not be taken as supporting the contention that
implied rights of action have fallen into disrepute. As stated earlier, the most that can be said in evaluation of the recent circuit
court opinions is that they continue in the general tenor set by the
Supreme Court and reflect the Court's general reluctance to recognize implied remedies in areas other than securities and related
regulation and civil rights. The greatest possibilities for implying
private rights in the future thus appear to be in these two areas.
In seeking to understand more fully the present status of the
implication process, it is important to examine not only the express statutorily related bases for the various opinions of the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts, but the underlying jurisprudential foundations of the decisions as well. While a review of
the relevant legislative histories and statutory purposes has played
a major role in each of the decisions, the Supreme Court and the
circuit courts have also shown an acute awareness of and concern
over the potential for conflict whenever consideration is given to
implying federal remedies in areas that may have traditionally
been left to regulation by the states. Because the Supreme Court's
239.
240.
241.

2 CoMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) at 24,177.
Id. at 24,181.
Id. at 24,184.
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recent rulings also raise some basic questions about the role of the
federal common law in the implication process, an examination of
federal common law is thus in order.
VI.

THE ROLE

OF FEDERAL COMMON LAW

The discussion so far has concerned decisions that, by focusing
upon legislative intent, have approached the implication process
primarily as a study of the statutory language itself. The first three
prongs of the Cort test illustrate the emphasis placed upon statutory construction and purpose. The fourth element in the Cort
analysis, however, presents the broader question of whether the relief sought is in an area that is generally relegated to the state
courts. This concern over federalism is the overriding issue that
has led the Court to apply the first three elements in i limiting
fashion. Furthermore, the fear of creating an undue tension between the federal and state systems of government has plagued the
federal judiciary in numerous settings since its inception. 4 2 The
existence of a federal common law is inextricably intertwined with
the problem and thus necessarily plays a significant role in the implication process. Yet, to date the implication decisions have not
addressed this aspect of the analysis.
As was noted earlier, 4 3 the Supreme Court in its unanimous
decision in J.I. Case Co. v. Borak2" based its holding alternatively
upon the general jurisdictional provision of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.24 In essence, this aspect of the Court's holding
permitted the creation of a vast area of substantive federal law
based on the existence of a statutory grant of jurisdiction. While a
similar analysis was recently rejected in Transamerica,the Court
there proceeded to distinguish the Investment Advisors Act from
the statute at issue in Borak24 Clearly, a general jurisdictional
grant will not by itself justify the implication of a private remedy;
however, it can significantly encourage such a result. The Borak
rationale, when combined with the Kardon negligence per se approach,24 7 leads to a basis for implication that arguably exists inde242. See generally C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 54 (3d ed.
1976).
243. See text accompanying notes 117-22 supra.
244. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
245. Section 27 provides that the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction of all actions, both on law and equity, that arise under the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976).
246. 444 U.S. at 20-21.
247. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
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pendently of the Cort analysis: the federal common law.
After the Supreme Court's decision in Swift v. Tyson,248 a substantial body of federal common law developed. In 1938, however,
the Court held in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins24 9 that federal
common law in diversity cases was an unconstitutional interference
with state sovereignty. In terms of policy, the Erie Court was concerned with the absence of uniformity between state and federal
50
courts and the resultant undesirable practice of forum shopping.
While Erie eliminated much of the federal common law that had
developed under the courts' diversity jurisdiction, it explicitly left
open the vast area of federal question jurisdiction. To the extent
that a federal common law has continued to flourish under this
branch of the federal courts' power to decide cases, the Borak rationale may still have a significant role to play, notwithstanding
Cort and its progeny2 51 Accordingly, a brief analysis of the
proliferation of the federal common law is in order.'5 '
248. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 166 (1842). See generallyTeton, The Story of Swift v. Tyson, 35
ILL. L.F. 519 (1941).
249. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
250. Id. at 74-78. See generally C. WRIGHT, supra note 242; Clark, State Law in the
Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALP L.J. 267 (1946);
Friendly, supra note 6.
251. For example, one commentator has suggested that the Borak rationale survives
the four-part Cort analysis and that it may be used as an alternative basis for implication:
"The need for uniform, nation-wide enforcement of a federal policy is strong justification for
implying a federal remedy. Thus, Borak, not Cort, is the governing precedent ... in the
consumer situation [in light of the Federal Trade Commission Act] ...

."

Note, Implied

Consumer Remedy Under FTC Trade Regulation Rule-Coup de Grace Dealt Holder in
Due Course?, 125 U. PA. L. Rlv. 876, 915 (1977). Cf. Pilla, supra note 72, at 26 ("Judicial
attention should focus not on what Congress might have intended by its silence, but, rather,
on how best to remedy a private injury caused by conduct which Congress did expressly
prohibit.")
252. This topic has been explored at length elsewhere and thus the discussion herein is
limited to an overview of the development of post-Erie federal common law. See generally
Broad, Federal Common Law: Protecting State Interests, 37 FED. BAR. J. 1 (Spring-Summer 1978); Friendly, supra note 6; Hill, The Law Making Power of the Federal Courts:
ConstitutionalPreemption, 67 COLUM. L. Rv. 1024 (1967); Mishkin, The Variousness of
"FederalLaw". Competence and Discretion in the Choice of National and State Rules for
Decision, 105 U. PA. L. Rv. 797 (1957); Panel Discussion, The Future of a Federal Common Law, 17 ALA. L. Rav. 10 (1964). Note, Exceptions to Erie v. Tompkins: The Survival of
FederalCommon Law, 59 HARv.L. REv.966 (1946). For a cataloguing of the post-Erie cases
and the various fields of substantive law involved, see, e.g., Annot., 31 L. Ed. 2d 1006 (1973).
A somewhat analagous question has been raised with regard to constitutional jurispru'aence. There has been considerable debate concerning the propriety of "subconstitutional"
decisionmaking by the federal courts in such areas as the fourth and fifth amendment exclusionary rules. Compare Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARv.L. Rav. 1 (1975) (advocating the continued development of a
federal constitutional common law) with Shcrock & Welch, Reconsidering the Constitu-
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On the same day that Erie was handed down, the author of
that opinion also put his signature on a decision that recognized
the continued vitality of a federal common law in federal question
cases.
In Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch
25 3
Co.

Justice Brandeis, speaking for the Court, ruled that the ap-

portionment of interstate waters was a matter to be determined by
federal common law.2 54 Just two years later, the Court in Deitrick
v. Greaney 55 was confronted with a statute that conferred federal
jurisdiction but contained no express private remedy. The case involved a suit by a receiver of a bank against a director to recover
on a promissory note given in violation of the National Banking
Act. The Court noted that illegality under the statute was a determination for the federal courts to make; hence, the Court set aside
any consideration of whether state law permitted the director to
plead illegality as a valid defense.2

56

The Deitrick Court, in estab-

lishing that a large body of law remained unchanged after Erie,
viewed the statutory policy as sufficiently strong to justify the implementation of uniform private remedies. In 1943, three years af257
ter Dietrick, the Court in Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States
held that an action on a check issued by the federal government
was governed by federal law rather than the local law of negotiable
instruments. Significantly, it was the absence of a contrary federal
statute that convinced the Court to deny the application of Erie
and eschew state law determination of the issue. 55 Once again, the
decision rested upon the implication of a federal remedy in the
face of congressional silence. In reaching its result the Clearfield
Court emphasized the need for a uniform federal rule of law affecting commercial paper.259 Consideration of the desirability of national Common Law, 91 HAnV. L. REv. 1117 (1978). See also Schrock & Welsch, Up From
Calandra: The Exclusionary Rule as a ConstitutionalRequirement, 59 MINN. L. REV. 251
(1974).
253. 304 U.S. 92 (1938).
254. Id. at 110.
255. 309 U.S. 190 (1940).
256. Accord, D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942). Although Deitrick

has been alleged on at least one occasion to be an implication case, it clearly is not since it
did not create a private remedy. The case more properly is classified as an exception to the
Erie requirement of state law determination of the issues. See Note, supra note 252, at 970-

71.
257.

318 U.S. 363 (1943).

258. "The authority to issue the check had its origin in the Constitution and the statutes of the United States and was in no way dependent on [state law] ....
In [the] absence of an applicable Act of Congress it is for the federal courts to fashion the governing
rule of law according to their own standards." Id. at 366-67.
259. Id. at 367. Accord, National Metropolitan Bank v. United States, 323 U.S. 454
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tional uniformity pays heed to the issues involved in the fourth
prong of the Cort analysis.
In recent years, the federal common law has continued to proliferate and has extended into numerous substantive areas ranging from nuisance2 e0 to landlord-tenant law26' to constitutional

rights. 62 It has been suggested that this line of cases presents a
six-factor analysis for determining whether, once federal jurisdiction exists by virtue of a federal statute, the question is to be determined by state or federal law.26 3 However they may be articulated, the relevant factors boil down to the single question of
whether federalization will promote the goal of uniformity. It is
this aspect of the continued development of federal common law
that relates directly to the Cort analysis. In determining whether
the subject matter is one generally regulated by the states, the
fourth Cort factor represents little more than a variation of the
problems raised by Erie and its progeny.
Judge Friendly, in his discussion of the Clearfield decision,
highlighted the importance of uniformity to both the federal common-law analysis and the implication process:
Clearfield decided not one issue but two. The first, to which most of the opinion was devoted and on which it is undeniably sound, is that the right of the
United States to recover for conversion of a Government check is a federal
(1945). The federal common law of federal commercial paper continues to flourish. See, e.g.,
Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. United States, 552 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1977). It
has recently been suggested that complete uniformity would be accomplished if the federal
courts were to adopt the Uniform Commercial Code into the body of the federal common
law. Note, Federal Commercial Paper and The Federal Common Law, 14 TULSA L.J. 208
(1978).
260. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972). See generally Note, Federal
Common Law: Judicially Established Effluent Standards as a Remedy in Federal Nuisance Actions, 7 ENvr'L AFr. 293 (1978); Note, Federal Common Law and Interstate Pollution, 85 HARV. L. Rav. 1439 (1972).
261. See Note, Federal Courts-Federal Common Law Determines Lessor's Duty to
Convey Possession to Government Standing as Lessee, 43 FORDHAM L. Rav. 1078 (1975).
262. E.g., Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). See text accompanying notes 19293 supra. For a more complete listing of the range of substantive areas see the authorities
cited in note 252 supra.
263. Certain considerations are likely to invoke the use of federal common law, such
as (1) issues involving a dispute between states or protection of a state's sovereign
rights; (2) issues related to the operation of federal statutory law or federal policy; (3)
issues affecting uniformity of law in areas where federal law applies; (4) issues affecting
the duties and operation of the federal government; (5) questions arising under maritime and admiralty claims; and (6) issues concerning international law.
Note, Federal Common Law: Judicially Established Effluent Standards as a Remedy in
FederalNuisance Actions, 7 Ervr'L Apr. 293, 296 (1978) (footnotes omitted). See generally
Friendly, supra note 6; Hill, supra note 252.
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right, so that the courts of the United States may formulate a rule of decision. The second, over which the Supreme Court jumped rather quickly and
not altogether convincingly, is whether, having this opportunity, the federal
courts should adopt a uniform nation-wide rule or should follow state
law.... The issue that must be determined in each instance is what heed
Congress intended to have paid to state law in an area where no heed need
constitutionally be paid-more realistically, in Gray's famous phrase, "to
guess what it would have intended on a point not present to its mind, if the
point had been present." We cannot expect that we shall always agree with
the answer to such a question; we do have a right to expect that the question
shall always be put.'"

Interestingly, the courts can view the role of uniformity in two
ways. In the Erie sense, uniformity requires that the plaintiff not
be able to secure a different result on the same claim by suing in
federal rather than state court. On the other hand, uniformity as
discussed herein may justify federalization as a means of avoiding
disparity between the states. In assessing a statutory grant of jurisdiction it is possible to marshall evidence of congressional intent to
assure uniformity in this second sense.
Another significant area of federal common law that intersects
with the implication process is that of labor relations. In Textile
Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills26 5 the Supreme Court held that
the statutory grant of federal jurisdiction in section 301(a) of the
Taft-Hartley Act2 66 authorizes creation of a federal common law
for the enforcement of promises to arbitrate grievances under collective bargaining agreements. The decision was based on the
Court's review of the legislative purpose and a finding that the desirability of consistency in the labor area was sufficient to justify
the development of a federal common law. As in all such cases, the
easier route for the Court would have been to defer to the previously established state law. The congressional policy of uniformity,
however, was held to justify, if not mandate, the creation of this
new body of federal law. Lincoln Mills demonstrates the judicial
concern that in some cases the application of state law by federal
courts might operate to defeat rather than to effectuate the goal of
uniformity.
264. Friendly, supra note 6, at 410 (footnotes omitted).
265. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
266. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976).

Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United
States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy
or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
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While Lincoln Mills is not without its critics, 28 7 ithas been

praised as a signal for legislators to leave to the courts the task of
guaranteeing federal rules of decision in cases involving the possibility of divergent results. As was observed by Judge Friendly:
One of the beauties of the Lincoln Mills doctrine for our day and age is that

it permits overworked federal legislators, who must vote with one eye on the
clock and the other on the next election, so easily to transfer a part of their
load to federal judges, who have time for reflection and freedom from fear as
to tenure and are ready, even eager, to resume their historic law-making function-with Congress always able to set matters right if they go too far off the
desired beam. '8

With the present concern for crowded federal dockets, one
might well say that it is now the federal courts that are overburdened. Although this shift in workload argues against a swift
expansion of implied federal remedies, it does not call for a halt to
judicial federalism. Indeed, while critics of implication usually refer to judicial legislation pejoratively, the leeway provided by Lincoln Mills has been commended both as a recognition of an intentional congressional "delegation" of power to the courts and as
"interstitial legislation." 2 9 The ramifications of such a method of
analysis for the implication of private federal remedies are
innumerable. °
Cort and subsequent cases require that federal courts look primarily to congressional intent to determine whether a private remedy should exist. In that light, it is interesting to note the impact
of Erie upon statutes that were enacted in the heyday of the federal common law. For example, the Securities Exchange Act, with
its general grant of jurisdiction, was enacted four years prior to
267. 353 U.S. 448, 460 (Frankfurter, J. dissenting); See also Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REv. 1

(1957).
268. Friendly, supra note 6, at 419.

269. Panel Discussion, supra note 252, at 22, 31 (remarks of Dean M. Lindsey Cowen
and Professor James C. Kirby, Jr.). In the words of Professor Kirby:

Dean Cowen has enunciated this same idea but he more accurately called it a "delegation." We are speaking here of a delegation by the Congress to the Judiciary of a portion of its legislative power. In the interest of clarity of analysis we should call it that
instead of some sort of federal common law. However, this delegation is not necessarily
bad and it is not necessarily new. It has been going on for years in anti-trust legislation.
Terms like "restraint of trade" and "unfair competition" have been presented to the
federal courts for determination of their exact meaning. What else can we call this
process.
Id. at 31.
270. As Judge Friendly predicted, the Lincoln Mills approach, if applied to implication under the securities acts, would have far reaching significance. Friendly, supra note 6,
at 413-14.
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Erie. This historical fact cannot be ignored when analyzing, for example, the current significance of the expansive Borak rationale.
The mere creation of federal jurisdiction in 1934 arguably demonstrated a congressional desire to expand the then proliferating federal common law. The Transamerica Court, when faced with a
post-Erie jurisdictional grant, 1 rejected Borak without mentioning Erie. This omission, however, did not eliminate the existence of
a historical factor, since neither the constitutional basis of Erie nor
the policy of avoiding forum shopping arose in the context of the
federal question issue determined in Transamerica.
The Erie ruling does not preclude implication based on a federal common-law rationale.17 2 Indeed, with respect to pre-Erie federal statutes, the creation of exclusive federal jurisdiction may well
evidence an intent to promote consistency and prevent forum
shopping. In such a case, the statutory grant of jurisdiction would
justify adding to the federal common law private remedies that
otherwise might languish with states and their respective commonlaw principles. For example, to leave securities regulation to the
common law of fraud and fiduciary obligation would fly in the face
of the obvious need for uniformity in an area of deep federal concern. 7 3 Although under the Cort approach such an analysis cannot
itself be dispositive, its weight should not be underestimated insofar as it impacts upon issues of congressional intent and federalism. It is far from clear, however, that Cort represents the exclusive basis of analysis.2 7 4 Consequently, the negligence per se
approach of the Kardon-Borak line of cases may have some, although limited, vitality in future implication decisions.
When dealing with individual liberties and federally guaranteed civil rights, the need for uniformity is equally compelling.
271.
272.

444 U.S. at 14.
While the lesson of Cort and its progeny is to look for the legislative purpose,

congressional silence can be seen as consistent with the expansion of existing federal common-law remedies:
It is quite possible, though, that the draftsmen considered the existing common law
remedies so effective that new private sanctions simply were not needed. This theory
would invite the continued recognition of prior remedies that do not impair the regulatory scheme, and would not clearly preclude the implication of new private claims

against statutory violations.
O'Neil, supra note 73, at 233.
273. Compare Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78
(1969), with Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186 (7th Cir. 1978), and Schein v. Chasen, 313 So.
2d 739 (Fla. 1974).
274. See Comment, Implied Causes of Action: A Product of Statutory Construction
or the Federal Common Law Power?, 51 U. COLo. L. REv. 355 (1980).
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Lack of uniformity from state to state contradicts a meaningful
concept of civil rights. Not surprisingly, it is this supposition that
has led courts to guard these rights with special vigor. Accordingly,
the civil rights area, like federal securities regulation, is a particularly appropriate one for the development of a federal common law
of remedies.
The continued vitality and expansion of the federal common
law in appropriate situations clearly belies any claim of an acrossthe-board retreat from federalism. It cannot be denied that concern for overworked federal courts mandates a cautious approach.
Erie, however, points to the strengths of judicial federalism and
provides a countervailing theme to the recent antifederalist approach of the Court. Furthermore, although implication will and
should continue to be the exception rather than the rule, even the
current Court has recognized two areas in which implication retains its vitality: first, the protection of constitutional2 75 or statutory217 6 civil rights and second, the safeguarding of investors under
the securities and related laws.27 Recent decisions in these areas
are consistent not only with Cort but also with the factors that
bear upon the more general question of when to recognize a federal
common law.
VII.

CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

After nearly sixty-five years of federal jurisprudence of implied remedies, the courts continue to maintain a relatively flexible
approach. In that time, however, the courts have gone through periods of expansion and contraction in determining the scope and
availability of these remedies. For example, as discussed earlier, in
the seminal Rigsby case 27 8 the Supreme Court held that for a private remedy to be implied from prohibitory criminal legislation,
the plaintiff must be able to demonstrate that he falls within a
class for whose "especial benefit" the statute was enacted. By distinguishing statutes that protect the general public from those
with a narrower focus, the Court relied upon the important element of legislative intent. In addition to the especial class require275. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
276. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1978).
277. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979); Zeffiro v. First
Pa. Banking & Trust Co., 623 F.2d 290 (3d Cir. 1980). See notes 43-49 supra.
278. Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916), discussed in the text accompanying notes 92-94 supra.
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ment of Rigsby, the Court has mandated that the injury alleged be
"of the type that the statute was trying to forestall. '" " In view of
these two pronouncements by the Court, it might at first glance
seem that the number of statutory violations that hold a potential
for implication is severely limited.
While this is in part true, it must be remembered that over
the years the Court has handed down a number of opinions that
have espoused a relatively broad approach to implication, in addition to those that have adopted a more restrained view. In each
instance, whether in the expansive context of Borak5 0 and Wyan8 and Cort,2 83 the
dotte281 or the more limiting mode of Amtrak2"
Court was attempting to remain faithful to the legislative intent
behind the statute in question. The Court's decisions, then, should
be seen not as antagonistic to the implication of private remedies,
but instead simply as indicative of the Court's desire to recognize
only those remedies that are consistent with, and in furtherance of,
statutory objectives. Indeed, Cort illustrated an attempt to clarify
the implication process by dividing the issue into four factors,
three of which bear directly upon legislative intent. Cort emphasized, in addition to Rigsby's "especial benefit" requirement, the
importance of explicit or implicit evidence of intent to provide a
private remedy that is consistent with the overall legislative
scheme. By definition, the consideration of congressional intent in
this three-fold manner flies in the face of any strict formula for
implication. Therefore, Cort preserves the flexibility that is so necessary for proper judicial statutory interpretation. 28
Even after the first three prongs of the Cort analysis are satisfied, the clearest of intents will not by itself justify implication in
the face of legislative silence. Cort raises the additional issue of
federalism by asking whether the asserted cause of action and subject-matter concern issues that are traditionally left to state law. In
deciding whether to federalize remedies, courts face the same considerations that must be weighed in determining the scope of the
279. Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 202 (1967).
280. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). See text accompanying notes 117-22
supra.
281. Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967). See text accompanying notes 123-26 supra.
282. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453
(1974). See text accompanying notes 147-54 supra.
283. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). See text accompanying notes 161-64 supra.
284. See Part H supra.
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federal common law.2 8 5 When posed in its limiting sense, the federalization question can be the key to the denial of a private remedy.286 In contrast, when viewed in its enabling sense-the need for
nationwide uniformity-the fourth Cort factor can be extremely
conducive to implication. In this sense, Borak and subsequent federal securities law cases are unquestionably consistent with Cort.
The most recent round of Supreme Court cases underscores
the viability of Cort as well as the continued vitality of implied
causes of action in civil rights "

7

and securities regulation2 88 cases.

In the face of these recent rulings, it is simply unrealistic to eulogize the demise of implied federal remedies. Certainly, the repeatedly voiced concern for overcrowded federal dockets presents a
counter-balancing factor. There can be no doubt, however, that the
lesson to be learned from Cort and its progeny is one of judicial
restraint, not total abstinence.
Moreover, while much of the implication activity has arisen
from prohibitory penal legislation, many of the cases denying the
existence of an implied remedy have dealt with statutes that include an administrative superstructure. When Congress has seen
fit to impose federal standards under the aegis of an administrative
agency an additional element is brought to the implication question. As is the case with the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the
creation of avenues for agency dispute resolution demonstrates a
distinct deference to the administrative process and provides an
argument against the recognition of a private remedy. When the
administrative agency is given exclusive enforcement or dispute
resolution power, this limiting rationale, which is akin to primary
jurisdiction, is particularly convincing, for the recognition of a private remedy would circumvent the clearly intended statutory
scheme. 8 9 In contrast, when dealing with regulatory schemes that
include only express private judicial remedies, as is the case with
the Securities Act of 1933 and the 1934 Securities Exchange Act,
the primary jurisdiction analogy is inapposite.
285. See Part VI supra.
286. Cf. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (limiting the scope of SEC
rule 10b-5's private remedy lest it impinge upon the corporate chartering statutes of the
several states).

287. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979). See also Davis v. Passman,
442 U.S. 228 (1979).
288. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
289. E.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979); National R.R. Passenger Corp.

v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974). See text accompanying notes 14754, 186-91 supra.
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Another pattern that has emerged from the cases is the distinction between prohibitory legislation and that which merely
mandates certain affirmative conduct, such as public disclosure of
pertinent information. In three of the five cases during 1979 the
Supreme Court denied implied remedies based on statutory provisions that were disclosure oriented.2 90 One explanation for such a
result is that disclosure requirements tend to show legislative concern for the public at large rather than for any particular class of
potential private plaintiffs. This distinction in statutory focus has
been especially significant in providing the basis for the recognition of some actions but not others in the field of securities regulation. The disclosure/prohibition dichotomy can be viewed as another way of phrasing the Rigsby especial class requirement as well
as a more specific manner of asking whether recognition of a remedy would be consistent with the overall statutory scheme and
purpose.
Although the recent Supreme Court cases have legitimately eschewed a doctrinaire approach, their lack of predictability gives little direct guidance to lower courts. It is clear, however, that the
circuit and district courts should not attempt to be overly zealous
either in denying or recognizing implied remedies. Their task is to
follow the Court's guidelines as closely as possible. As was observed by Judge Frank:
There is an important difference, usually overlooked by commentators, between the interpretive latitude of the highest courts and that of lower courts.
A court like that on which I sit, an intermediate appellate court, is, vis-a-vis
the Supreme Court, "merely a reflector, serving as a judicial moon." Judges
on such a court usually must, as best they can, cautiously follow new "doctrinal trends" in the court above them. As their duty is usually to learn, "not
the congressional intent, but the Supreme Court's intent," their originality is
often inadvertent."1

Given the lack of sophisticated guidelines, the result may well be
that the Supreme Court will serve as the ultimate arbiter in each
case. Although the result might be a multitude of decisions for the
Court, this is as it should be. Because of the sensitive nature of the
countervailing implication issues, the Court must be prepared to
deal with the age-old tension between legislative and judicial decisionmakers, as well as with the tensions surrounding federalism in
general. As the past sixty-five years of Supreme Court casei make
290. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. at 19-20 (the portion of
the opinion dealing with § 206(a)); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979);
Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979).
291. Frank, supra note 8, at 1271 (citations omitted).
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clear, the implication problem belies rigid rules and by its very nature necessarily requires a great deal of case-by-case consideration.
In sum, the Supreme Court has not entered into a new era for
implied federal remedies. There is no need to bemoan-or
praise-their demise, nor is there reason to herald a new wave of
remedies. The recent cases fall into line with earlier doctrine and
patterns that have been followed for years-one of general restraint with room for implication in compelling cases. While it is
true that the Burger Court's general conservatism has had a limiting impact in implication cases, only two of the five most recent
cases outrightly prohibited the implied relief sought. Rather than
attempting to identify shifting trends, the lower federal courts
should look to the well-established unifying principles that have
emerged over time. Only by maintaining the proper balance between the guiding principles and the case-by-case analysis that
they require will the courts be able to properly deal with the implication cases as they arise in the future.

